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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2 and 78-2a-4.
SCOPE OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW
By order of the court dated August 5, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court granted review
by certiorari limited to the following issues: (1) Whether the Nollan/Dolan (Nollan v.
Califnornia Coastal Comm % 483 U.S. 825,841-42 (1987) mdDolan v. CityofTigard, 374,
377 (sic) (1994) "rough proportionality" test applies where an alleged taking results from a
uniform legislative land-use scheme rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative decision;
(2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding the district court's review was limited to the
administrative record; and (3) whether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits review
regardless of the state of the administrative record.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the Nollan/Dolan (Nollan v. California Coastal Comm yn,
483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) and Dolan v. City ofTigard, 374, 377 (1994) heightened
scrutiny "rough proportionality" test applies where an alleged taking results from a uniform
legislative land-use scheme rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative decision.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the district court' s review
was limited to the administrative record.
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits review regardless
of the state of the administrative record.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a facial constitutional challenge, a municipal ordinance withstands constitutional
attack if it "debatably promotes the legitimate [governmental] goals of increased public
health, safety, or general welfare." Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 253
(Utah Ct. Apps. 1998); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,388,47 S.Ct.
114,118 (1926). A facial takings challenge must show that a municipal regulation does not
"substantially advance legitimate state interests." Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374,385,
114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Code. Ann Sec. 17-27-1001(a)
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-801
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-807
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 11-36-101, et. seq..
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90a-l, et. seq.
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 18.08.010 {see App. "2")
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 15.28.010 {see App. "2")
United State Constitution, Amend. V
Utah State Constitution, Art. l,Sec. 22
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below

NATURE OF THE CASE:
This case involves claims asserted by Respondent and Cross-Petitioner B.A.M.
Development, LLC [hereinafter, "BAM"], a subdivision developer, that Petitioner and
Cross-Respondent Salt Lake County [hereinafter, the "County"] violated BAM's
constitutional guarantees ofjust compensation for "takings" of private property by requiring
an "exaction" of a certain area of BAM's property where it adjoins a state highway as a
condition of the county's approval of a proposed subdivision plan, to-wit: a dedication of
certain road width as needed to comply with the County's highway width ordinance.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
•

August 14, 1998 - BAM's Complaint filed in Third District Court [R. 1 - 13].

•

April 23 and 24, 2001 - Case was tried in a bench trial before Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson [R. 353, 354 (internal pagination, pp. 1 - 330)].

•

May 21, 2001 - Closing argument heard by Judge Hanson [R. 355].

•

June 8, 2001 - Trial court entered a Memorandum Decision finding in favor
of the County on all claims asserted in BAM's Complaint, and directing the
County's counsel to prepare proposed findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law [R. 247 - 252].

•

July 30, 2001 - Trial court entered a second Memorandum Decision finding
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that (a) BAM's counsel had not timely objected to the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to the court by the County's counsel;
and (b) the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to
the court by the County's counsel fairly and accurately represented the court's
decision. [R. 258 - 259]. The same day, the trial court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 266 -273], and its Judgment for Defendant
[R. 274 - 275].
August 1, 2001 - BAM simultaneously filed in the trial court a "Motion for
Entry of New and/or Additional Findings" and "Motion for New Trial" [R.
276 - 279] along with a purported "Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact"[R.
280-291].
August 16, 2001 - The County filed its memoranda in opposition to BAM's
Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for New
Trial [R. 292 - 328].
September 19, 2001 - Trial court filed a third Memorandum Decision, denying
BAM's Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for
New Trial for the reasons set forth in the County's August 16,2001 opposition
memoranda, and directed the County's counsel to prepare a proposed Order to
effectuate the denial of BAM's motions [R. 335- 337].
October 15, 2001 - Trial court entered Order denying BAM's Motion for
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Entry of New and/or Additional Findings [R. 338 -340].
•

October 18, 2002 - BAM filed Notice of Appeal and Bond for Costs on
Appeal [R. 341 - 344].

•

December 24, 2001 - Utah Supreme Court entered Order transferring appeal
to Utah Court of Appeals [R. 346].

•

February 20, 2004 - Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion and decision,
BAM Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 2004 UT App 34
(see,App. "1").

•

August 5, 2004 - Utah Supreme Court granted the parties' petition and crosspetition for writ of certiorari.

B.

Statement of Facts *

1.

On July 30, 1997, Salt Lake County [hereinafter, "the County"] received the

application and plat of plaintiff B.A.M. Development [ "BAM"] for its proposed Westridge
Meadows subdivision ["Westridge"] to be developed at approximately 7700 West 3500
South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's proposed plat indicated a 40-foot
highway dedication at 3500 South Street running along the north boundary of BAM's
property. BAM's fee simple interest in the parcel proposed by subdivision development
extended to the center line of 3500 South street.
2.

On August 26,1997, BAM's subdivision proposal was approved by Salt Lake

lr

This Statement of Facts adopts the "Findings of Fact" as entered by the trial court
[R. 266 - 269]. The trial court's factual findings are not challenged by BAM.
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County engineering staff, subject to compliance with County roadway standards, including
a 40-foot right-of-way ["ROW"] highway dedication of 3500 South, which was and is a state
highway, running along the portion of BAM's proposed subdivision which abutted said
highway.
3.

The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County

Ordinance 15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-801. The
County ordinance requires dedication of highway ROW space by developers of abutting
property in accordance with the County's "Transportation Master Plan."
4.

The County relied upon traffic projections and recommendations from the

Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Utah Department of Transportation in formulating
its Transportation Master Plan. The road-width recommendations of the Wasatch Front
Regional Council were based upon a long-range transportation study projecting highway
capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the year 2020.
5.

Prior to receiving final subdivision approval from the County, BAM closed its

purchase of the proposed subdivision parcel, although BAM had entered into its purchase
contract to acquire the parcel subject to the contingency that it must receive County approval
for its proposed subdivision.
6.

On September 15, 1997, the Utah Department of Transportation ["UDOT"]

received BAM's amended subdivision plan from the County for its approval. UDOT
responded with a required 53-foot half-width highway ROW on the portion of BAM's
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property abutting 3500 South.
7.

On or about June 10, 1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed

by the Wasatch Front Regional Council and UDOT that the currently required highway ROW
for 3500 South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot half-width).
The County then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its Transportation Master
Plan.
8.

On or about June 15,1998, the County transportation engineer approved BAM's

subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt Lake County roadway
standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW dedication of 3500 South.
9.

On June 23,1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval

to BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street.
10.

On July 2, 1998, BAM's attorney filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning

Commission's dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40 feet.
BAM's appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed by
the County.
11.

On July 15,1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal.

12.

On June 23, 1999, the County planning commission approved BAM's

amended subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53-foot highway
dedication.
13.

On August 18, 1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final
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approval of the Westridge subdivision plat (with the 53-foot highway dedication).
14.

On August 27,1999, the Westridge subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt

Lake County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision.
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SUMMARY OF THE COUNTY'S ARGUMENT
1.

No unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation

occurred in this case under the United States or Utah constitutions where the County's
highway dedication ordinance required dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and
comprehensive "legislative" transportation scheme, rather than an ad hoc, site-specific
"adjudicative"decision. While the county's exaction meets the "essential nexus" testof
Nollan, the "rough properionality"analysis of the United States Supreme Court's Dolan
decision regarding development "exactions" is not applicable in this case.
2.

The court of appeals correctly held that the district court's review is generally

limited to the administrative record pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec. 17-27-1001.
3.

Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits the filing of this matter as an

"constitutional taking issue"in the district court review regardless of the state of the
administrative record.
ARGUMENT
1
No unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just
compensation occurred in this case under the United States or Utah
constitutions where the County's highway dedication ordinance required
dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive
"legislative" transportation scheme, rather than an ad hoc, site-specific
"adjudicative"decision. Thus, the Dolan "rough proportionality" test
does not apply in this case.
BAM asserts that the County's subdivision approval and highway-dedication
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legislative scheme is "facially flawed" under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Art. 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution2. In a facial challenge, "...the challenger need
not 'seek a final decision regarding the application of the regulation to the property at issue
before the government entity charged with its implementation.'" Smith Investment Co. v.
Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(citation omitted). This is because a
facial challenge to an ordinance is deemed ripe at the moment of its enactment. On the
opposite hand, a facial challenger bears a "heavy burden" in attacking an ordinance, even an
"extraordinary one," because courts have a "strong reluctance" to proclaim a municipal
legislative act as facially invalid, and "will resolve any doubts in favor of the ordinance's
constitutionality." Id., 958 P.2d at 251 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The County's requirement that BAM dedicate a portion of its property for highway
right-of-way as a condition of development approval was the result of a general legislative
prescription, not an individualized adjudicative decision. BAM has never contended in this
litigation that it only objects to the manner in which the County highway dedication
ordinance was applied with particularity to BAM (i.e., an "as applied" challenge), as opposed
to the ordinance per se. BAM has also never contended that the County failed to adhere to
its own ordinance, or to the applicable state statutes, when it imposed the exaction in this
case. Thus, BAM's challenge is to the ordinance itself because, according to BAM, it
results in an uncompensated taking of private property (i.e., a "facial challenge").

2

Appellant's Brief, Utah Court of Appeals, p. 11.
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The Court of Appeals' decision effectively remands this litigation to the County
administrative process to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing on BAM's administrative
appeal, and to create a record thereof. Because the Court of Appeals decided this case on
procedural grounds, it did not address in any detail the "legislative" vs. "adjudicative"
distinction which is the focus of the instant appeal. The Court of Appeals did, however,
summarily conclude that because BAM was required to dedicate an additional 13 feet rightof-way as a condition of development approval, the so-called Nollan/Dollan "rough
proportionality" analysis3 would apply. The County maintains that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the "rough proportionality" test of the Nollan and Dolan decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court should guide the County's administrative decision making, and any
subsequent appellate review.
The dominant contemporary federal "takings"jurisprudence governing development
"exactions," such as required dedication of land for roads and highways, derives chiefly from
two United States Supreme Court cases4. First, in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, 483
3

As discussed in detail below (see pp. 32-33, infra), this Nollan/Dolan "test"
actually involves two separate and distinct tests.
4

Although BAM asserts takings claims under comparable provisions of the Utah
Constitution (Art. I, §22) as well as the Federal Constitution (Amend. V), this discussion
focuses on authority generated under the Federal Constitution's takings clause.
Generally, where there is no showing that comparable provisions of the Utah Constitution
and the Federal Constitution should be interpreted differently, Utah courts will look to the
Federal Constitution. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90 (fn.4) (Utah 1993). Cf, Snyder v.
Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325, fn.4 (Utah 2003)(where only the Utah Constitution was
placed at issue, analysis of the comparable provision of the Federal Constitution was not
controlling).
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U.S. 825,107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987), the plaintiffs/landowners sought approval from a California
agency to rebuild their beachfront house. The agency granted the approval, subject to the
condition that the plaintiffs dedicate a public easement behind their house, along the shore,
so that the public could pass freely between the two public beaches bordering the plaintiffs1
property. Finding the required dedication invalid, the Court accepted as legitimate the
agency's concern that the house that the plaintiffs proposed to build would block visual
access to the beach and create a "psychological barrier" to its use by the public. But the Court
considered the requirement of a public easement behind the house to be unrelated to that
interest, because it did nothing to enhance visual access of the beach from the street or to
overcome any psychological barrier. Instead, the easement merely facilitated use of the public
beaches by people already aware of and using them. Thus, the Court concluded that the
dedication lacked an "essential nexus" between the condition imposed and the government
interest in imposing it, which rendered the dedication a taking. Id. at 841-42,107 S.Ct. 3141.
In short, although the Court declined to deem the condition a per se taking as it had for other
physical invasions or dedications of property interests, the Court required that there be a
logical connection between the governmental interest to be served and the particular
condition imposed on the landowner.
However, Nollan failed to explicitly characterize the requisite degree or nature of the
relationship between the governmental interest and the development condition imposed. In
1994, the Court granted certiorari in Dolanv. CityofTigard, 512 U.S. 374,114 S.Ct. 2309,
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for the express purpose of settling that unresolved issue. Id., 512 U.S. at 377. In Dolan, the
property owner sought city approval to double the size of her retail store and to pave her
parking lot. As a condition of approval, the city required the owner to dedicate a 15-foot strip
of land for use as a pedestrian path and bikeway and also to dedicate a portion of her property
within the 100-year flood plain for a publicly accessible "greenway." The city defended the
bikeway requirement with a calculation that the increased size of the retail store would add
937 car trips per week and that the bikeway "could" help to offset the increased traffic. The
city defended the flood plain dedication on the basis that paving the gravel parking lot would
increase the amount of impermeable ground, thus adding to flooding from the adjacent and
already overburdened creek. Id. at 379-82.
The Court, in examining the dedications, established a two-step inquiry for analyzing
regulatory takings claims in the context of conditional use or development permits. First, as
it had in Nollan, the Court examined whether there was an "essential nexus" between the
conditions and legitimate governmental interests, such that the purpose to be served by the
condition was the same as the government's interest in the use restriction. The Court found
that nexus requirement readily satisfied. More specifically, the Court determined that there
was a logical relationship between relieving traffic congestion and requiring a bike path and
between the increased risk of flooding due to the parking lot and requiring property within
the local flood plain to remain undeveloped. 512 U.S. at 387-889. Second, having determined
that the "essential nexus" inquiry was satisfied, the Court turned to the degree of connection
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between the dedications and the projected impact of the proposed development. Id. at 388.
The Court held that there must be "rough proportionality" between a development's
projected impacts and the exactions required of the property owner as a condition of
development, and emphasized that it was requiring only approximate, or "rough,"
proportionality: "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some effort to quantify its finding in support of the dedication ... beyond the conclusory
statement that it could offset some of the [impacts of the development].ff Id. at 395-96. But
the government "must make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."
Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
It is perfectly sensible that an individualized {i.e., ad hoc) development exaction
should require an individualized determination of the relationship between the exaction and
the impact which the exaction seeks to remedy. Thus, when local building approvals are
requested by developers, exactions are sometimes established ad hoc based on unique
characteristics of the development proposal or the land on which it will be located. Courts
have categorized such exactions as "adjudicative" local government decisions because they
arise on an individualized (and frequently negotiated) basis, and are not the result of a
general, universally applied legislative regulation.
Since Dolan, courts have split as to whether the Dolan portion of the Nollan/Dolan
test applies where, as here, the development condition flows from a general legislative
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scheme rather than an adjudicative decision. The distinction between a "legislative" mandate
and an "adjudicative" requirement is the heart of this appeal.
Here, the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not address the County's
argument, embraced by the trial court, that the Dolan "rough proportionality" component of
the analysis does not apply in this case5. The trial court correctly concluded as a matter of
law that dedications required of a subdivision developer in order to comply with the County's
highway-dedication ordinance are qualitatively different than the exactions analyzed in the
Nollan and Dolan cases, which were ad hoc, site-specific adjudicatory decisions by local
land-use authorities. The highway-dedication ordinance at issue here, involves a generally
applicable legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is imposed individually.
This distinction is crucial to determining the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to the

5

The dissent referred to the "adjudicative" vs. "legislative" issue in passing, but
made very little actual analysis of this distinction. However, while admitting that this
issue is "unsettled," the dissent criticized the distinction on two grounds: (1) "[i]t is not
clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity
responsible for the taking"(BAMDevelopment v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 733,
2004 WL 316141, ^[56 (emphasis added)); and (2) that "it is not always easy to tell the
difference between an individualized, adjudicative decision and a 'uniformly imposed'
legislative scheme." Id., ^[57. Neither of these arguments carry the day in this case. First,
the County has never argued that applicability of the Dolan test in any way turns on the
"type of governmental entity" which seeks to impose the exaction. On the contrary, the
County maintains that the same constitutional test should apply identically no matter
what type of governmental entity is involved. Second, it is not the least bit difficult in
this case to distinguish between the "legislative" or the "adjudicative" character of the
County's highway dedication ordinance. The ordinance is, rather, clearly a legislative
scheme of general application; it was not applied by bureaucratic fiat to BAM through the
individualized, discretionary judgment of any County administrator, but rather was the
mandate of the plain language of the ordinance.
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County's ordinance6. First, it is necessary to review the statutory scheme under which the
County derives its authority to regulate highway dedications.
(A) Utah's Statutory Scheme for County Regulation of Subdivision Development
Utah statute grants authority to the counties for regulating development of
subdivisions within their boundaries. The County Land Use Development and Management
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001), authorizes counties "to enact all
ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development
ofland within the county.. .unless . . . expressly prohibited by law." Id. Sec. 17-27-102(1).
First, Sec. 17-27-102(1) confers a general grant of authority upon counties to regulate land
use:
"To accomplish the purposes of this chapter, and in order to provide for the
health, safety, and welfare,... counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions,
and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development of land
within th county, including ordinances ... governing [land] uses, density, open
spaces, structures, buildings,... [and] transportation ... ."
(Emphasis added). Chapter 27 creates express power in the counties to regulate and approve
development of subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-801 provides as follows:
"Enactment of subdivision ordinance.

6

In recognizing the legislative/adjudicative distinction, the Dolan court
specifically noted that "[t]he sort ofland use regulations discussed in the case just cited
[upholding the regulations], however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present
case. First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of
the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's
application for a building permit on an individual parcel." Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at 385
(J. Rehnquist).
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"The legislative body of any county may enact a subdivision ordinance
requiring that a subdivision plat comply with the provisions of the subdivision
ordinance and be approved as required by this part before:
(1) it may be filed or recorded in the county recorders office; and
(2) lots may be sold."
Subsection 807 requires that the recordation of an approved final subdivision plat acts
as a dedication of the streets specified therein for public use:
"Dedication of streets.
"(1) Plats, when made, acknowledged, and recorded according to the
procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets and
other public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for
the public for the uses named or intended in those plats."
(Emphasis added). Under the authority of the foregoing statutes, Salt Lake County enacted
its Subdivision Ordinance (Chap. 18, Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances ["SLCCO"]).
The Subdivision Ordinance provides a comprehensive scheme for application, review and
approval of a subdivision, and contains numerous provisions specifically applicable to the
instant case. First, Sec. 18.08.010 provides the general outline for subdivision application
and approval procedure. In conjunction with the subdivision ordinance, the County in this
case was required to apply its highway-dedication ordinance (SLCCO Sec. 15.28.010). That
ordinance provides in relevant part as follows:
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required.
"... no building or structure shall be erected, reconstructed, structurally altered
or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on any lot or
parcel of land which abuts a major or secondary highway, as shown on the
map entitled,' Official Maj or and Secondary Highway Plan, Salt Lake County,'
... or other public street which does not conform to current county width
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standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel within the right-of-way of
the highway to be widened or additional required street width has been
dedicated to the county and improved."
(Emphasis added). Thus, under its ordinance, the County cannot approve a subdivision plan
that does not dedicate sufficient highway right-of-way to conform to "current county [road]
width standards." Id.. There is no issue in this case as to whether the County varied from
the terms of its own ordinances. BAM has never claimed in this case that the County either
failed to apply, or exceeded the scope of, its own ordinances.
Before BAM submitted its amended 44-lot subdivision plat in compliance with the
Planning Commission's first preliminary approval, the County had adopted a modification
of its "Transportation Master Plan" map7. Consequently, when the Planning Commission
gave its preliminary approval to BAM's amended plat, it incorporated the updated 53-foot
ROW in compliance with Ordinance Sec. 15.28.010. The County took this action because
under its own ordinance, it was required to. It was necessary to apply the ordinance to BAM
solely because BAM's property abutted a highway.
(B)

The County Subdivision and Highway Dedication Ordinance, as a
Legislative Measure of General Application, Is Not Subject to a Dolan
Analysis

7

Undisputed trial testimony established that the "Transportation Master Plan Map,"
though under different nomenclature, is the same thing as the "Official Major and
Secondary Highway Plan, Salt Lake County" referenced in the Ordinance. See, Statement
of Facts, supra, *fl; see also trial testimony of Andrea Pullos [R. 353 (internal p. 157,1.
2 4 - p . 158,1.180)].
PAGE 18 OF 43

The Court of Appeals found that a development "exaction" (i.e., the highwaydedication requirement) is unconstitutional if it is not "roughly proportionate" to the
anticipated impact of the particular development upon municipal infrastructure and services.
Thus, under the Court of Appeals' application of Nollan/Dolan, an "individualized
determination" of the proportionality between the exaction and the impact is required of the
County when it enforces the highway-dedication ordinance.
The County's highway-dedication requirement operates independently of any unique
or individual topographical characteristics or proposed uses of specific parcels to which it
applies. As with any subdivider who chooses to develop a parcel which abuts a highway,
BAM was required here to comply with a uniform legislative scheme which expects all
similarly situated subdividers8 to dedicate highway rights-of-way consistent with current
uniform road-width standards.

Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that

community development occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation
planning. Otherwise, road-width requirements for new construction along major traffic
corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, and other
impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, this "individualized"
impact analysis would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel
located along the side of a highway. Rather than having roadway segments with even and

8

"Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property which
abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 15.28.010
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consistent widths, road edges and shoulders, road boundaries would be required to jut in and
out in front of each abutting parcel, as dictated by an "individualized determination" of each
parcel's traffic impact. The absurd practical consequences of this application of Dolan
"rough proportionality" in such a case are obvious.
This distinction between a generally-applied "legislative," and a site-specific
"adjudicative," decision is critical to determining the proper analysis for constitutional
"takings" review. In the recent California Supreme Court case of San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.
City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87,27 Cal.4th 643,117 Cal. Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002),
this very distinction was discussed at length, and specifically in the context of the
Nollan/Dolan "proportionality" analysis. There, the plaintiff-hotel owner sought a city
permit to convert a long-term rental housing facility into a short-term tourist rental facility.
The city imposed a "housing replacement" exaction which required plaintiff- and all other
residential hotel conversion applicants - to provide replacement comparable residential
housing units or pay an in lieu fee to a city-administered fund. Id., 41 P.3d at 92. The court
distinguished the replacement-housing exaction from an "ad hoc" individualized recreation
fee imposed by a municipality on condominium developer which it previously invalidated9.
The San Remo court noted that in its earlier case, the city had
"relied on no specific legislative mandate to impose the fee condition and no
legislatively set formula to calculate its size [;] the [fee] condition was
imposed ad hoc, entirely at the discretion of the city council and staff."

'See, Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 12 Cal.4th 854 (Cal. 1996).
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Id., 41 P.3d at 104 (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 434-435). By
contrast, San Francisco's housing-replacement exaction in San Remo, which the court
ultimately upheld, was a '"generally applicable development fee or assessment... imposed
not 'individually' but 'pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability.'"/^., 41 P.3d
at 105 (emphasis in original). The court added that, "[t]he 'sine qua nort for application of
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the 'discretionary deployment of the police power' in 'the
imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases" (id., 41 P.3d at 105 (citation omitted)),
reasoning that "[wjhile legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper
leveraging [by a municipality], such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary
restraints of the democratic political process10." Id.. Thus the court upheld the housingreplacement scheme, affording a "deferential" level of scrutiny to the city's "generally
legislated" exaction scheme.
Other recent cases have produced similar results. For example, in Rogers Machinery
v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. Apis. 2002), rev. den. (Or. Sp. Ct.) 52. P.3d
1057, cert. den. (U.S. Sp. Ct.) 538 U.S. 903,123 S.Ct. 1482, a developer challenged a county
ordinance assessing a traffic impact fee (TIF) designed to defray road improvement costs.
The court found that the TIF was imposed according to a generally-applied, legislative
formula, that it did not involve the exercise of ad hoc adjudicative discretion, and that it was

10

Similarly, in the present case, BAM's remedy for what it perceives as unfair
County subdivision development conditions is a legislative remedy, not a judicial one.
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mandatory on broad classes of property. Id., 45 P.3d at 981-982. Thus, the court held, the
TIF "does not fall with the express reach or implicit rationale of Dolan's heightened scrutiny
test." Id..
"The legislative-versus-adjudicative imposition of a development condition
has proved especially significant for courts that have extended Dolan fs
heightened scrutiny test to monetary exactions. With near uniformity, lower
courts applying Dolan to monetary exactions have done so only when the
exaction has been imposed through an adjudicatory process; they have
expressly declined to use Dolan fs heightened scrutiny in testing development
or impact fees imposed on broad classes of property pursuant to legislatively
adopted fee schemes."
Id. 45 P.3d at 971 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Home Builders Ass'n of Central
Arizona v. City ofScottsdale, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997), a city development fee was upheld
under Dolan scrutiny because the Dolan court
"was careful to point out that a city's adjudicative decision to impose a
condition tailored to the particular circumstances of an individual case," [but]
"[b]ecause the Scottsdale case involves a generally applicable legislative
decision by the city, the court of appeals [below] thought Dolan did not apply.
We agree, though the question has not been settled by the Supreme Court."
Id., 930 P.3d at 1000 (emphasis in original). In Home Builders Ass }n ofNorthern California
v. City of Napa, 108 Cal.Rptr.2s 60 (Cal. Ct. Apl. 1st Dist. 2001) the city had required
developers through its "inclusionary housing" ordinance to set aside a specified percentage
of new units for low or moderate income housing. Plaintiffs takings challenge under
Nollan/Dolan was rejected by the court
"... because Nollan and Dolan are inapplicable under the facts of this
case.'[T]he intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny formulated by the high
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court in Nollan and Dolan is intended to address ... land use 'bargains'
between property owners and regulatory bodies - those in which the local
government conditions permit approval for a given use on t]he owner's
surrender of benefits which purportedly offset the impact of the proposed
development... [Individualized development fees warrant a type of review
akin to the conditional conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan, where
generally applicable development fees warrant the more deferential review that
the Dolan court recognized is generally accorded to legislative
determinations.'"
Id., 108 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 65 - 66 (quoted citations omitted; emphasis added). Likewise, in
Arcadia Development Corp. v. CityofBloomington, 552N.W.2d281 (Minn. Ct. Apis. 1996),
the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a city ordinance which required mobile home park
owners who close their parks to pay relocation costs for displaced residents. The court
rejected plaintiffs urged application ofDolan, stating that
"... cases interpreting Dolan have confined its 'rough proportionality' analysis
to adjudicative land-use dedication situation or to classic 'subdivision
exaction' cases ... Because this case involves a challenge to a city-wide,
legislative land-use regulation, Dolan's 'rough proportionality' test does not
apply."
Id., 552 N.W. 2d at 286.11 Here, the County's highway-dedication ordinance is just such a
county-wide, generally-applicable legislative scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory
u

For additional examples of decisions upholding a regulation or exaction under a
Dolan analysis on the basis of the legislative/adjudicative distinction, also see, Greater
Atlanta Home Builders' Ass 'n v. De Kalb County, 588 S.E.2d 694, 697 (Ga. 2003);
Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695-696 (Colo. 2001); Garneau v.
City of Seattle, 147 F3d 802, 811 (C.A. 9 1998); Home Builders'Ass 'n of Cent Arizona
v. City ofScottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997); Home Builders'Ass'n of Dayton
v. City of Beaver Creek, Case Nos. 94 CV 0012, 94 CV 0062, Ohio Comm. PI. (1996)
at 17-18 (not reported in N.E. 2d); Pringle v. City of Wichita, 917 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Kan.
App. 1996); San Mateo County Coastal Landowners' Ass 'n v. County of San Mateo, et.
al, 45 Cal.Rptr. 2d 117, 131-132 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995); Harris v. City of Wichita,
Sedgwick County, Kansas, 862 F.Supp. 287, 293-294 (D.Kan. 1994).
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standard for road-width dedication by subdivision developers12. These standards are
designed to ensure that new subdivisions which abut major or secondary highways will
conform to current highway width and design standards as part of a regional transportation
plan designed to accommodate future community growth and traffic demands.
Consequently, the highway-dedication requirement necessarily affects only those
developers whose property abuts a major or secondary highway. The ordinance utilizes a
legislatively adopted "formula" that standardizes road-width dedication based upon the size,
location, type, and projected traffic volume of each highway in the county. The exaction in
this case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary exaction imposed on an individualized basis
at the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors attributable exclusively
to BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded, the County highwaydedication ordinance
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners
who choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway
[and] the assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not
individualized, but rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable
County Transportation Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners
whose property abutted 3500 South."
Memorandum Decision, p. 3 [R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny
on review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests."

n

See also, Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 20102, 204(Ga. 1994) (refusing to apply Dolan to city parking lot ordinance requiring owners
to install barrier curbs and landscaping improvements), cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1116, 115
S. Ct. 2268 (1995).
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Two enormous threshold obstacles beset BAM as a facial challenger in this case.
First, in 1992 the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council,
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) set forth the standard to be applied to a facial constitutionality
challenge to a municipal ordinance. It held that," [a] statute regulating the uses that can be
made of property effects a taking if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."
'. "Id. at 2894 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although BAM claims that the County
ordinance in question is facially unconstitutional, it does not - nor can it - make claim that
it has been deprived of all economically viable use of its property. On the contrary, BAM
was able to make full use of 44 of its originally planned 46 lots13, and was able to proceed
with its subdivision, which it "essentially completed.14"
In Smith Investment, supra, plaintiff-developer purchased a parcel zoned for
commercial construction. After building a shopping center on the portion of the parcel, the
13

Appellant's Brief, p. 6,11. 4-5. This means that relinquishing the two lots, BAM
lost less than 5% of the value of its property (2 out of 46 lots is approximately 4.35%).
By comparison, the Smith Investment landowner lost "about 43%" of its land value
{Smith, supra, 958 P.2d at 259) yet that was not enough to convince the court that a taking
had occurred. In fact, the court here points out that "regulations causing much greater
diminution in value than that found here have been upheld against takings challenges."
(citing, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117,
71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915) (92.5% diminution); Pace Resources, Inc. v.
Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir.1987) (89.5%); William C. Haas &
Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.1979) (95%); Sierra Terreno
v. Tahoe Regfl Planning Agency, 79 Cal.App.3d 439, 144 Cal.Rptr. 776, 777 (1978)
(81%). Id..
14

/rf.,p.6.
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plaintiff reserved the rear 15.8 acre portion of the parcel for future use. In the meantime,
Sandy city "downzoned" the reserved (rear) portion to residential use only. The plaintiff
brought a facial challenge against the City, asserting substantive due process and takings
claims, alleging - like BAM here - that the ordinance amendment was "economically
'unduly oppressive.5" Id., 958 P.2d at 255 (record citation omitted) . But this court
responded by holding that
"...even when land value 'is substantially diminished as a result of zoning, that
fact alone will not be deemed a sufficient ground for finding the regulation
arbitrary and capricious. Such losses generally are deemed to be simply the
uncompensated burdens one must accept to live in an ordered society."
Id., 958 P.2d at 255-256. The Smith Investment court continued, "[w]here the zoning
ordinance appears to the court to be a generally sensible one, even a serious reduction in
value may not be sufficient to persuade the court that the ordinance is arbitrary and
unreasonable." Id., 958 P.2d at 256.
Here, BAM has not even attempted to demonstrate that it was deprived of all
"economically viable" use of its parcel. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
BAM, it only shows that BAM lost - at most - 2 out of 46 building lots. The other 44 lots
were fully developed as planned. The alleged loss of two building lots is questionably
sufficient to even qualify as a "substantial" diminution in value, and even at that, under Smith
Investment, would not begin to undermine the authority of the County to regulate highwaywidth dedications.
Second, BAM offered no evidence at trial, and does not even argue on appeal, that
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(a) the County lacked a "legitimate governmental interest" in transportation corridor
planning15, or (b) that the highway dedication ordinance is not "reasonably related" to such
an interest. See, Smith Investment at 958 P.2d 252. As a facial takings challenger, BAM
must carry the burden of showing that the ordinance "does not advance legitimate state
interests." See, Smith Investment, 958 P.2d at fn. 18; see also, Dolan v. City ofTigard, supra,
512 U.S. at 385,114 S.Ct. at 2316 (1994). But this proposition BAM has not even attempted
to establish. Accordingly, BAM did not and cannot meet its burden under a facial challenge
to the County's highway-dedication ordinance.
All four cases cited by BAM are readily distinguishable from the instant case in that
they concern exactions mandated in response to individual impact characteristics which were
unique to the developments in each case. In this case, however, the County highwaydedication requirement operates independently of any unique characteristics or proposed uses
of specific parcels to which it applies. As with any land subdivider who chooses to develop
a parcel which abuts a highway, BAM was required here simply to comply with a uniform
legislative scheme which expects similarly situated land subdividers16 to dedicate highway
rights-of-way consistent with current uniform road-width standards.
Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that community development
15

In fact, BAM concedes that the County has a valid interest in this respect.
Appellant's Brief (Court of Appeals), p. 8.
16

"Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property
which abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec.
15.28.010
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occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning. Otherwise, under
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-width requirements for new construction along
major traffic corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size,
usage, and other impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, the BAM
doctrine would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel located along
the side of a highway. Rather than having roadway segments with even and consistent
widths, road edges and shoulders would be required to jut in and out in front of each abutting
parcel, as dictated by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's impact. The absurd
and nightmarish practical consequences of this notion are obvious.
However, while BAM correctly perceives the County's highway-dedication ordinance
as a generalized "location-based" exaction, as opposed to an individualized"impact-based"
exaction like those in the cases upon which BAM relies, it still insists that the County's
ordinance must pass muster under the "individualized" Dolan approach.
This distinction is critical to determining the proper analysis for constitutional review.
In the recent California Supreme Court case of San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of
San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87,27 Cal.4th 643,117 Cal. Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002), this very distinction
was discussed at length, and specifically in the context of the Dolan "proportionality"
analysis. There, the plaintiff-hotel owner sought a city permit to convert a long-term rental
housing facility into a short-term tourist rental facility. The city imposed a "housing
replacement" exaction which required plaintiff- and all other residential hotel conversion
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applicants - to provide replacement comparable residential housing units or pay an in lieu
fee to a city-administered fund. Id., 41 P.3d at 92. The court distinguished the replacementhousing exaction from an "ad hoc" individualized recreation fee imposed by a municipality
on condominium developer which it previously invalidated17.

The San Remo court noted

that in its earlier case, the city had
"relied on no specific legislative mandate to impose the fee condition and no
legislatively set formula to calculate its size [;] the [fee] condition was
imposed ad hoc, entirely at the discretion of the city council and staff."
Id.,4l P.3dat 104 (citing Ehrlich, supra, 911 P.2d at 434-435). By contrast, San Francisco's
housing-replacement exaction in San Remo, which the court ultimately upheld, was a
"'generally applicable development fee or assessment *** imposed not 'individually5 but
'pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability.'" Id., 41 P.3d at 105 (emphasis in
original). The court added that, "[t]he 'sine qua nort for application of Nollan/Dolan
scrutiny is thus the 'discretionary deployment of the police power' in 'the imposition of landuse conditions in individual cases" {id., 41 P.3d at 105 (citation omitted)), reasoning that
"[w]hile legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper leveraging [by a
municipality], such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the
democratic political process18." Id.. Thus the court upheld the housing-replacement scheme,

11

See, Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 12 Cal.4th 854 (Cal. 1996).

18

Similarly, in the present case, BAM's remedy for what it perceives as unfair
County subdivision development conditions (if any remedy is appropriate) is a legislative
remedy, not a judicial one.
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affording a "deferential" level of scrutiny to the city's "generally legislated" exaction
scheme.
Here, the County's highway-dedication ordinance is just such a generally-applicable
legislative scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory standard for road-width dedication by
subdivision developers. These standards are designed to ensure that new subdivisions which
abut major or secondary highways will conform to current highway width and design
standards as part of a regional transportation plan designed to accommodate future
community growth and traffic demands.
Consequently, the highway-dedication requirement necessarily affects only those
developers whose property abuts a major or secondary highway19. The ordinance utilizes
a legislatively adopted "formula" that standardizes road-width dedication based upon the
size, location, type, and traffic volume of each highway in the county. The exaction in this
case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary assessment imposed on an individualizedbasis at
the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors attributable exclusively to
BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded, the County highwaydedication ordinance
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners
who choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway
[and] the assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not
individualized, but rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable
County Transportation Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners
whose property abutted 3500 South."
19

County Code of Ordinances, 15.28.010
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Memorandum Decision, p. 3 [R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny
on review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests."
Courts have long struggled with drawing a distinction between a valid, police powerbased regulatory action and a compensable "taking." The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
admitted that it has "'... been unable to develop any 'set formula5 for determining when
'justice and fairness5 require that economic injuries caused by public action5 must be deemed
a compensable taking." KaiserAetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164,175,110 S.Ct. 383,390
(1979), quoting Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124,98 S.Ct. 2646,
2659 (1978). Three factors prescribed by the Court to guide the takings analysis include (a)
the character of the governmental action; (b) its economic impact; and (c) its interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 SCt
2862, 2874, 81 LEd 815 (1984).
In a case analogous to the instant case, involving a imposition of drainage
improvement costs upon a railroad, the North Dakota Supreme Court employed the Monsanto
analysis in Southeast Cass Water Resource District v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 527
N.W. 884 (N.Dakota 1995). There the court upheld a statute which permitted water districts
to impose costs for changing railway bridges and culverts to accommodate drainage as a
valid police-power regulation, and not a taking, even though it created substantial expense
to the railroad. The court noted that in Monsanto, the Supreme Court found that the chemical
maker "... could not successfully challenge 'the ability of the Federal Government to regulate
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the marketing and use of pesticides,' because 'such [police-power] restrictions are the
burdens we all must bear in exchange for the 'advantage of living and doing business in a
civilized community.'" Id., 527 N.W.2d at 895, quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007. The
North Dakota court also distinguished Nollan and Dolan. It quoted Dolan for the proposition
that "... [a] land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interest' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."
527 N.W.2d at 896, quoting Dolan, 114 SCt at 2316 (citations omitted). The North Dakota
court concluded that "...BN Railroad's duty in this case arises not from a municipal
'adjudicative decision to condition,' but rather from an express and general legislated duty
under a constitutional reservation of police power over a corporation." 527 NW2d at 896.
Similarly, the ordinance at issue here is not a "adjudicative" action peculiar to BAM's
property creating unique development conditions, but rather, it is a "generally legislated
duty" the creation of which was expressly authorized by the Utah Legislature.
Accordingly, the County maintains that in a challenge to a legislatively adopted landuse regulation generally affecting similarly situated {e.g., highway-abutting) landowners, the
proper constitutional inquiry is whether or not BAM has met its burden of demonstrating
either that (a) the ordinance fails to advance a legitimate governmental interest, or (b) that
is deprived BAM of all economically viable use of its land. Finally, BAM cannot possibly
claim (and hasn't claimed) that the County's ordinance thwarted its "reasonable, investmentbacked expectations" since BAM purchased the parcel with full knowledge of the ordinance.
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Inasmuch as BAM has not argued, or attempted to prove, either such proposition, the trial
court's decision upholding the ordinance and dismissing BAM's takings claims should be
affirmed.
BAM's self-portrayal in this case as a victim of abusive or "insensitive"20 local
government exactions is disingenuous. As an experienced subdivision developer, BAM was
well aware that subdivision approvals are universally conditioned on dedication of roadwidth ROWs where a subdivision parcel abuts a highway. According to the trial testimony
of BAM's president, Scott McCleary, he had been a developer for 20 years and had built
some 2000 homes in the Wasatch Front area21. There are obvious compensatory economic
benefits for a subdivision developer in owning a parcel which abuts a major highway, which
a nearby subdivider whose land is more remote from the highway do not enjoy (e.g., ease of
public access from the adjacent thoroughfare; visibility and exposure of location to the public
as a marketing edge; relatively short and direct access to highway-routed utilities such as
water and sewer main lines, which reduce a developer's costs for acquisition of easements,
installation of extended underground lines, etc.). As the trial court observed22, these are all
factors which a developer considers in determining the economic viability of a prospective
subdivision project. But in the real world, such commercial advantages also have a cost; in

'Appellant's Brief (Court of Appeals) pp. 32, 33.
R. 353 (internal p. 77,11. 5-18).
Memorandum Decision, p. 4 [R. 250]
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this case, the cost is the highway-dedication requirement. Apparently, BAM expected to
enjoy the economic benefits of the convenient, accessible and conspicuous location of its
subdivision, without incurring any of the attendant costs.
(C)

Separating Nollan from Dolan: An "Essential Nexus" does not Necessarily
Require "Rough Proportionality"

The County acknowledges that the Nollan "essential nexus" test is a valid requirement
for constitutional analysis of a development exaction23. Even in its lengthy and vociferous
dissenting opinion, the Court of Appeals found that the County's highway dedication
ordinance passed the "essential nexus" test24. But the dissent then would have found that
the County failed the Dolan "rough proportionality" test. While the Nollan and Dolan tests
seem often to be inextricably connected in much of the current takings dialog25, the County
maintains that the two tests are, indeed, two discrete analytical models, and can be readily
separated. Thus, while an essential nexus should exist between a governmental interest and
the nature of the development exaction which a political subdivision seeks to impose, it does
not necessarily follow that the individualized "rough proportionality" requirement of Dolan
must apply.

23

While the Nollan court devised the phrase "essential nexus" to distinguish its
takings analysis from the "rational relationship"test evolved in its line of equal protection
decisions, the phrases are functionally indistinguishable.
24

BAM Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 729-730,2004 UT
App34ffl58-62.
25

Thus, although the Nollan/Dolan analysis is frequently referred to in cases as a
singular "test," it actually involves two very different criteria.
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The County suggests that where a "legislative" exaction plan (i.e., one of general
application to all similarly situated property owners) receives scrutiny, the sole test should
be the Nollan "essential nexus" test. Hence, once it is found that such a governmental
entity's legislative scheme bears an essential nexus to its own legitimate governmental
objectives, the consitutional inquiry should then end. It is only where the entity has imposed
an individualized "adjudicative" decision tailored to the unique characteristics of an owner's
property that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test should come into operation.
2
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the district court's review is
generally limited to the administrative record pursuant to Utah Code
Ann., Sec. 17-27-1001.
The Court of Appeals' decision effectively remands this litigation to the County
administrative process to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing on BAM's administrative
appeal, and to create a record thereof. The County maintains that the Court of Appeals erred
only in holding that the "rough proportionality" test of the Dolan decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court should guide the County's administrative review and recordmaking, and any
subsequent appellate review. The Court of Appeals' majority analysis of Sec. 17-27-1001
as requiring a municipality to conduct appropriate hearing and recordmaking in appeals of
most land use decisions is a sensible application of the statute and well supported by the
authorities therein cited. However, as discussed in Argument 3, infra, this holding only
applies in appeals which are not asserted as a "constitutional takings issue" under Utah Code
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Ann. Sec. 63-90a-l,e/. seq..
The Court of Appeals decision in no manner defeats or restricts the ability of a private
property owner to seek judicial redress for what it considers excessive municipal exactions
and subdivision development conditions. The decision below simply requires that a County
must provide an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing to be conducted, and a record
thereof to be created. In accordance with Sec. 27-17-1001 and, by analogy to Sec. 17-27708, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the district court's review is limited to a review of
the official administrative records generated before the appropriate county hearing officer
or panel. This interpretation of Sec. 1001 is sensible and consonant with the legitimate
legislative goals of reducing the delays and expenses of traditional litigation, redundant or
inconsistent adjudicative proceedings, and providing parties with the efficiencies of an
administrative tribunal. The requirement of a prejudicial administrative hearing and record
also provides a mechanism for a municipality to review the rationale of its own agency
decisions where contested by an affected citizen. Thus, the "administrative hearing and
recordmaking" requirement read into Sec. 1001 by the Court of Appeals promote sound
public policy and judicial economy.
BAM incorrectly reasons that the Court of Appeals "improperly relies upon the phrase
'land use decision5 as contained in Section 17-27-100l(3)(a) [because] [t]his is not a 'land
use' case." BAM Petition for certiorari at 17. BAM then argues that the "land use" appeal
provisions of Sec. 1001 apply only to "zoning or re-zoning cases," but not, as here, to a
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subdivision "development approval case" Id.. BAM's legal basis for this distinction is far
from clear.
In reality, the phrase "land use planning" broadly encompasses "activities such as
zoning, control of real estate development and use, environmental impact studies and the
like."26 The statute itself (i.e., Sec. 17-27-1001) does not limit land use appeals solely to
zoning decisions, as BAM would have it. On the contrary, Sec. 17-27-1001 (2)(a) provides
that "[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of or in violation
of this chapter may file a petition for review... ." (Emphasis added). The phrase "this
chapter" refers to Chapter 27, which includes Sec. 17-27-801, et. seq, entitled
"Subdivisions." The latter section of Chapter 27 grants counties the very authority under
which subdivision approval, such as that given by Salt Lake County to BAM Development,
may be conditioned and granted. In short, any form of real estate development regulation,
including subdivision approval (and all conditions required for such approval) is a form of
land-use control which comes under the umbrella of Sec. 17-27-1001 as a "land use decision"
subject to the appeals provisions contained therein. Hence, BAM's argument, based on a
tortured and overly restrictive definition of the phrase "land use decision," lacks merit.
In short, then, the Court of Appeals' limitation of district court review to the
administrative record is a sound interpretation of Sec. 17-27-1001 in cases generally which
challenge a political subdivision's land use decision. However, as discussed below, Utah

26

Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 880 (emphasis added).
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statute carves out a specific exception for those challenges asserted as "constitutional takings
issues" under Sec. 63-90a-l, which apparently are entitled to special treatment.
3
Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits filing of an action on a
"constitutional taking issue"regardless of the state of the administrative
record.
In granting limited certiorari review, the Supreme Court defined the third issue of this
appeal as "[w]hether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits review regardless of the
state of the administrative record." Order of Utah Supreme Court, August 5, 2004.
Section 63-90a-4 provides, in relevant part:
(1)

(2)

Each political subdivision shall enact an ordinance that:
(A) establishes a procedure for review of actions that may have
constitutional takings issues; and
(B) meets the requirements of this section.
(a)
(i)
Any owner of private property whose interest in the
property is subject to a physical taking or exaction by a
political subdivision may appeal the political
subdivision's decision within 30 days after the decision
is made.
(b)

(c)

The private property owner need not file the appeal authorized
by this section before bringing an action in any court to
adjudicate claims that are eligible for appeal.
A property owner's failure to appeal the action of a political
subdivision does not constitute, and may not be interpreted as
constituting, a failure to exhaust available administrative
remedies or as a bar to bringing legal action.

In seeking certiorari, BAM argued that the Court of Appeals "overlooked" Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 63-90a-4, entitled "Constitutional Taking Issues,"which, BAM claims, conflicts
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with - and controls over - the Court of Appeal's interpretation of Sec. 17-27-1001 as
requiring an administrative hearing and record making by the relevant municipality. BAM
Petition for Certiorari at 15.
The County objects to Supreme Court consideration of this issue on the ground that
the issue was Sec. 63-90a-4 was not properly preserved below. BAM never raised Sec. 6390a-4 as an issue below, either before the trial court or before the Court of Appeals27. It is
axiomatic that "[ijssues not raised in the court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari
unless the issue arose for the first time out of the court of appeals decision." DeBry v. Noble,
889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). Clearly, this new issue did not "arise for the first time out
of the court of appeals' decision," inasmuch as it was never briefed or argued to the Court
of Appeals. Thus, BAM should be precluded from raising the issue of Sec. 63-90a-4 at this
juncture.
However, if considered on the merits, it appears that Sec. 63-90a-4 is applicable in the
context of this case. That statute, entitled "Constitutional Taking Issues," provides that
political subdivisions are required to adopt the type of administrative review of constitutional
takings claims contemplated by the County's "takings relief ordinance discussed above.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90a-3. The County's takings relief procedure conforms to this

27

Interestingly, BAM cited, without discussion, to Sec. 63-90a-l, et seq. in the
"Determinative Law" section of its Docketing Statement (#.v., filed October 18, 2001, at
p. 11), but never briefed the issue it for which it sought certiorari in either its opening
brief or its reply brief filed in the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the statute was not
addressed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
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requirements by providing a method by which an aggrieved citizen may seek review of a
constitutional takings claim. Other avenues of administrative review are available for land
use decisions which may or may not involve claims of unconstitutional takings28.
Sec. 63-90a-4 allows to a citizen to seek judicial relief while bypassing the political
subdivision's administrative takings relief review provided as an option by the statute. A
plain reading of the statute29 suggests that where a private property owner chooses to
denominate his or her objection to an action of a political subdivision as a "constitutional
taking issue," the claim may bypass the local administrative process and be filed directly in
district court. Accordingly, subject to the preservation objection discussed above, the County
concedes that inasmuch as BAM's claim was asserted as a "constitutional taking issue," it
was properly heard and decided in the district court.
CONCLUSION
By its own assertion, BAM's challenge to the County's highway-roadwidth dedication
exaction is "facial." However, BAM has not met the heightened standard applied to a facial
challenge to a municipal land use ordinance. It has not shown (or argued) either that the
County's ordinance does not advance a legitimate governmental interest, or that the
ordinance deprived BAM of all economically viable use of its land.

28

For instance, zoning decisions and variance applications are routinely appealed to
the County's Board of Adjustment pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec. 17-27-703, 704 and
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances §19.92.030 A.
29

Which apparently has not been interpreted by any Utah appellate decision.
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Secondly, no unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation
occurred in this case. As the trial court concluded, the heightened scrutiny "takings"
requiring and "individualized determination" of "rough proportionality" analysis applied in
the

Supreme Court's Dolan case is not applicable in this case. The Dolan "rough

proportionality" standard does not apply to a generally-applied legislative land-use scheme,
as occurred here. The County ordinance at issue here applied equally and even-handedly to
all highway-abutting land subdividers, and was not the product of an "ad hoc" individualized
discretionary (i.e., "adjudicative") act. Therefore, while the ordinance should - and does satisfy the "essential nexus" test of Nollan, it is not subject to the Dolan "rough
proportionality" test at all. Rather, the party challenging the ordinance must show that the
ordinance lacks an "essential nexus" (i.e., it is not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental interest), which BAM has not even attempted to do in this case .
Third, Utah's statutory scheme for county regulation of subdivision development
expressly permits the requirement of highway dedication as a condition to subdivision
approval. The County's subdivision and highway dedication ordinances are a valid police
power land-use regulation entitled to "deferential" judicial scrutiny, not a constitutional
"taking" of private property.
Finally, although the Court of Appeals properly interpreted Sec. 17-27-1001 as
limiting district court review of a land use decision appeal to the administrative record, this
limitation does not apply to appeals involving a "constitutional takings issue," as this case
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does, pursuant to the language of Sec. 63-90a-4. Therefore, this action was properly brought
and tried in the district.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2004.

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
By:

DONJCETTH. HANSEN
Deputy District Attorney
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postage prepaid (2 copies) to:
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Attorney at Law
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On this "}S day of
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B.AJVL DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah body politic and political subdivision of the State
of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20010840-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 20, 2004.
Rehearing Denied April 8, 2004.
Background: Developer sought license to
develop subdivision, and county zoning and
planning commission granted preliminary
approval after developer agreed to dedicated certain portion of the property for future road widening. Subsequently, however, board requested additional dedication
of land, and, upon developer's objection to
increase, denied its license application
without receiving any evidence. Developer
appealed to board of commissioners, claiming request for additional dedication
amounted to unconstitutional taking, and
board of commissioners, without taking evidence, upheld denial of license. Developer
appealed. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J.,
found in favor of county. Developer appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thorne,
J., held that it was reversible error for
trial court to receive evidence.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion.
1. Statutes ®=>188, 212.6
In context of statutory interpretation,
courts presume that the legislature used each
word advisedly and courts give effect to the
term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning.
2. Zoning and Planning <2>745.1
Court of Appeals reviews county's land
use decision as if the appeal has come direct-

ly from the agency, rather than from district
court; thus, the standard for Court of Appeals' review is the same standard established for district court's review. U.C.A.
1953, 17-27-1001.
3. Zoning and Planning <S»744, 745.1, 747
On appeal from district court's review of
county's land use decision, Court of Appeals'
review is limited to the record provided by
the county board of commissioners; Court of
Appeals may not accept or consider any evidence outside the board's record and cannot
weigh evidence anew, rather, Court of Appeals must simply determine, in light of the
evidence before the board, whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as
the board. U.C.A.1953,17-27-1001.
4. Eminent Domain <3=*307(2)
Historically, takings determinations are
mixed questions of law and fact.
5. Zoning and Planning <3=»641, 748
It was reversible error for trial court, on
review of land use decision of county board of
commissioners confirming denial of developer's application for license to develop subdivision, which decision was reached without
board receiving any evidence, to receive evidence regarding developer's claim that predicate for denial, county's requirement that
developer dedicate additional land for prospective street widening, amounted to unconstitutional taking; court lacked statutory authorization to receive evidence, and it could
only determine whether board acted arbitrarily or capriciously, given the lack of record. U.C.A.1953, 17-27-1001(3)(a).
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for Appellant.
Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and
THORNE, JJ.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
HI B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. (BAM),
appeals from a district court decision finding
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that no unconstitutional taking occurred
when Salt Lake County (the County) required BAM to dedicate additional land as a
condition of subdivision approval. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
112 In 1997, BAM sought to develop a
subdivision located at 7755 West 3500 South
in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Salt Lake
County Planning and Zoning Commission
(the Commission) granted preliminary approval for the proposed subdivision. In the
original subdivision plat, BAM agreed to dedicate a forty-foot strip of land in anticipation
of 3500 South being widened. In April 1998,
the County informed BAM that after consulting with the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT), the County had determined
that BAM must dedicate an additional thirteen-foot strip of land abutting 3500 South in
anticipation of future road expansion. BAM
objected to the increase because it had already drafted and divided the subdivision
plots utilizing the forty-foot dedication.1
BAM argued that increasing the dedication
to fifty-three feet would alter several plots
dramatically and would require reconfiguration of the subdivision at great expense.
Without receiving any evidence, the Commission denied BAM's license to develop their
subdivision without the fifty-three-foot dedication.
113 BAM appealed to the Salt Lake County
Board of Commissioners (the Board), by filing a "Notice of Claim" with the Board. In
this Notice of Claim, BAM claimed that
"[t]he uncompensated dedication and improvement of the additional roadway constitute^] an unconstitutional 'taking,' not reasonably justified by the actual impact created
by the proposed development." Without
conducting a hearing, taking evidence, or is1. Below, BAM argued that "[t]he uncompensated
dedication and improvement of the additional
roadway constitutes an unconstitutional 'taking,'
not reasonably justified by the actual impact created by the proposed development." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, BAM did not challenge the dedication of the first forty feet of land and has
waived review of that portion of the dedication.
2. BAM also argued that the County violated
Utah's constitutional protections of Equal Protec-

suing findings, the Board upheld the Commission's decision.
114 BAM then filed suit in district court
claiming that the County's demand was unconstitutional because it was not roughly proportional, as required by Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309,
2319-20, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). After trial,
the district court found in favor of the County, concluding that the rough proportionality
test did not apply. BAM objected to the
district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed a motion for a new
trial. The district court overruled BAM's
objections and denied its motion for a new
trial. BAM appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
11 5 BAM argues that the County's dedication requirement of thirteen additional feet
constitutes a taking of its land without just
compensation, in violation of the United
States Constitution.2 However, we must
first determine whether the district court
acted properly when it received evidence and
then ruled on the constitutionality of the
land-dedication requirement. Resolution of
this issue requires statutory interpretation,
which we review for correctness. See Valley
Colour Inc. v. Beuchert Builders Inc., 944
P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1997) (noting that " *[i]n
matters of pure statutory interpretation, an
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling
for correctness and gives no deference to its
legal conclusions' " (citations omitted)).
ANALYSIS
116 The County Land Use Development
and Management Act, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001), authorizes counties "to enact all ordinances, resolutions, and
tion and Uniform Operation of Laws. However,
because we find that the district court misinterpreted Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001
(2001) and received evidence in this case when it
should have found the Board's treatment of
BAM's takings claim to be arbitrary and capricious, and we remand on that basis, we need not
address the takings question or the other issues
raised by BAM.
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rules that they consider necessary for the a determination that the decision violates a
use and development of land within the coun- statute, ordinance, or existing law." Utah
ty
unless
expressly prohibited by Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (3)(b).
law." Id. § 17-27-102(l).3 If a landowner
[1] 11 7 While no Utah Court has specifidisagrees with a county land use decision, cally addressed the standard of review applithat landowner can appeal the decision, pur- cable to appeals brought pursuant to section
suant to Utah Code Annotated section 17- 17-27-1001, we have addressed the standard
27-1001. Section 17-27-1001 (3)(a) provides of review for appeals taken pursuant to Utah
that when a county's land use decision is Code Annotated section 17-27-708 (2001),
appealed to the district court, that court shall which contains language similar to that of
"presume that land use decisions and regula- section 17-27-1001.5 Compare Utah Code
tions are valid; and
determine only Ann. § 17-27-708, with id. § 17-27-1001.
whether or not the decision is arbitrary, In the absence of any case law interpreting
capricious, or illegal" Id (emphasis add- section 17-27-1001, we, by analogy, rely upon
6
ed).4 "A determination of illegality requires case law interpreting section 17-27-708.
3. We cite to the most recent version of the statute
for convenience However, all amendments relevant to this opinion will be noted
4. Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 provides, in relevant part
(1) No person may challenge in district court a
county's land use decisions made under this
chapter or under the regulation made under
authority of this chapter until that person
has exhausted all administrative remedies
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any
decision made m the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of the decision with the district court
within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered
(3) (a) The courts shall
(I) presume that land use decisions and
regulations are valid, and
(n) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal
(b) A determination of illegality requires a
determination that the decision violates a
statute, ordinance, or existing law
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-1001(1), (2)(a),-(3)(a)(b)
(2001)
5. Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-708 provides, in relevant part
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjustment may petition the
district court for a review of the decision
(2)(a) The district court's review is limited to a
determination of whether the board of adjustment's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal
(b) A determination of illegality requires a
determination that the board of adjustment's
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or ex
isting law
(4)(a) The board of adjustment shall transmit
to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders

and, if available, a true and correct transcript
of its proceedings
(5)(a)
(I) If there is a record, the district court's
review is limited to the record provided by the
board of adjustment
(n) The court may not accept or consider any
evidence outside the board of adjustment's
record unless that evidence was offered to the
board of adjustment and the court determines
that it was improperly excluded by the board
of adjustment
(b) If there is no record, the court may call
witnesses and take evidence
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the
board of adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708, (1), (2)(a), (4)(a)
(5)(a), (5)(b), (6) (2001) (emphasis added)
6. We acknowledge that the analogy to section
17-27-708 is not perfect For example, section
17-27-708(5)(b) authorizes the district court to
call witnesses and receive evidence if no record
was made below, see id § 17-27-708(5)(b), or if
on review the district court determines that the
Commission erroneously excluded evidence See
id § 17-27-708(5)(a)(n) In contrast, section
17-27-1001 does not authorize the district court
to receive evidence or call witnesses However,
this distinction merely strengthens our position
that the district court erred in receiving evidence In the case of section 17-27-1001, the
legislature did not authorize the district court to
receive evidence even though it had done so in
other situations See Utah Code Ann § 17-27708(5)(b) "[W]e ' "presume that the legislature
used each word advisedly and [we] give effect to
the term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning " ' " Department of Natural Res v
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co, 2002 UT
75,1113, 52 P3d 1257 (citations omitted) Accordingly, we conclude that section 17-27-1001
does not authorize the district court to receive
evidence Instead, the district court can only
review the record made before the County
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[2,3] 118 In Patterson v. Utah County
Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct.
App.1995), landowners sought a "special exception under a county zoning ordinance."
Id. at 603. The county conducted a heanng,
received evidence, and then granted the exception. See id. Pursuant to section 17-27708, another landowner appealed the decision
to the district court, where the county's actions were found to be "arbitrary, capricious,
and illegal." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603.
The matter was then appealed to this court.
See id. On appeal, the parties attempted to
introduce new evidence. See id at 610-11.
We concluded, because the board of adjustments had conducted a hearing and received
evidence, that we were limited to the existing
record. See id. at 604. In reaching this
conclusion, we stated:
Since the district court's review of the
Board's decision was limited to a review of
the Board's record, we do not accord any
particular deference to the district court's
decision. Instead, we review the Board's
Next, the dissent incorrectly claims that Sandy
City v Salt Lake County, 827 P 2d 212 (Utah
1992), prohibits our analogy to section 17-27708 In Sandy City, the Utah Supreme Court
cautioned against the use of statutes relating to
cities in county-land-use appeals See id at 220
The court noted that " 'the respective statutes
dealing with cities and counties confer different
powers ' " Id (citations omitted) The court
further noted, in a footnote, that in the earlier
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, we had
erroneously relied on a municipal statute, had
applied an incorrect standard of review, and had
limited our review to the administrative record
See id n 4
In Sandy City, no statute governed appeals
from county land-use decisions See id In contrast, here, section 17-27-1001 sets forth this
court's standard of review-whether the county's
action was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal "
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-1001 (5)(b) Furthermore, in Sandy City, this court erroneously applied a municipal standard of review to a county
land-use decision See Sandy City, 827 P 2d at
220 n 4 Here, contrary to the dissent's claim,
we do not substitute section 17-27-708 for section 17-27-1001 Instead, we simply look to
cases interpreting similar language to determine
how the legislature intended courts to review
county land use decisions
Next, the dissent implies that we apply the
standard of review set forth in section 17-27708, while ignoring section 17-27-1001 We do
not substitute the standard of review in section
17_27-708 for the one m section 17-27-1001
Instead, because of an absence of clear guidance

decision as if the appeal had come directly
from the agency. Thus, the standard for
our review of the Board's decision is the
same standard established in the Utah
Code for the district court's review.
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Board's decision we
will consider all the evidence in the record,
both favorable and contrary to the Board's
decision. Nevertheless, our review, like
the distnct court's review, "is limited to
the record provided by the board of adjustment
The court may not accept or
consider any evidence outside the board['s]
record
" We must simply determine, in
light of the evidence before the Board,
whether a reasonable mind could reach the
same conclusion as the Board. It is not
our prerogative to weigh the evidence
anew.
Id at 603-04 (citations and footnotes omitted.) 7
by the legislature, we merely refer to section 1727-708 by analogy because both statutes limit the
district court's review to whether the county's
decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal "
Compare Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708(2)(a),
with id § 17-27-1001(3)(a)
Finally, the dissent makes much of the "County's concession in its brief that 'BAM followed
the appeal procedure outlined in the Utah Statutes and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordinance provisions] ' " We agree However, our
focus is not on whether BAM followed the correct procedure, but whether the district court
exceeded the scope of its authority pursuant to
section 17-27-1001 when it received evidence in
this case Any "concession" made by BAM has
no bearing on the propriety of the district court's
actions
7. In Patterson v Utah County Bd of Adjustment,
893 P 2d 602 (Utah Ct App 1995), we determined
that appellate courts were bound by the record
before the board of adjustments See id at 604
However, Patterson did not address the import of
section 17-27-708(5)(b), which allows the district court to receive evidence if no record was
made below See Utah Code Ann § 17-27708(5)(1) (2001) Still, Patterson provides some
guidance regarding how we should review appeals pursuant to section 17-27-1001, because it
addresses a situation, like the one here, when the
appellate court cannot receive evidence and can
only determine, on the record before it, whether
the administrative agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally See Patterson, 893 P 2d at
604
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H 9 Here, neither the Commission, nor the
Board, received evidence on whether the
County's requirement of an additional thirteen feet was a "taking " Instead, both approved the County's action without a hearing
Consequently, the district court had no record to review The lack of a record apparently prompted the district court to receive
evidence and determine for itself whether the
County had unconstitutionally taken BAM's
property However, the plain language of
section 17-27-1001 does not authorize the
district court to receive evidence See Utah
Code Ann § 17-27-1002(3)(a)8 Thus, we
conclude that the district court is limited to
the record made before the County and can
determine only whether the County's decision was "arbitrary, capncious, or illegal"
Id. § 17-27-1001(3)(a)(n), see also Wilcox v
CSX Corp, 2003 UT 21,118, 70 P3d 85 (noting that courts first look to the plain language of a statute and only look beyond the
plain language if there is an ambiguity)9

not required to bear more than their equitable share of the capital costs in relation to
the benefits conferred " Id at 1114 (quotmg
Banberry Dev Corp v South Jordan City,
631 P2d 899, 905 (Utah 1981) (additional
citation omitted)) In assessing the reasonableness of an exaction, a fact finder may
consider, among other factors
(1) the cost of existing capital facilities, (2)
the manner of financing existing capital
facilities (such as user charges, special assessments, bonded indebtedness, general
taxes, or federal grants), (3) the relative
extent to which the newly developed properties and the other properties m the municipality have already contributed to the
cost of existing capital facilities (by such
means as user charges, special assessments, or payment from the proceeds of
general taxes), (4) the relative extent to
which the newly developed properties and
the other properties in the municipality
will contnbute to the cost of existing capital facilities m the future, (5) the extent to
which the newly developed properties are
entitled to a credit because the municipality is requiring their developers or owners
(by contractual arrangement or otherwise)
to provide common facilities (inside or outside the proposed development) that have
been provided by the municipality and financed through general taxation or other
means (apart from user charges) in other
parts of the municipality, (6) extraordinary costs, if any, in servicing the newly
developed properties, and (7) the timeprice differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts paid at different times

[4] 1110 The absence of a record in this
case is highly problematic, because historically, takings determinations are mixed questions of law and fact See Lucas v South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003,
1071, 112 SCt 2886, 2922, 120 LEd2d 798
(1992) (Blackmun, J , dissenting) (noting that
whether government action has depnved a
claimant of his property without just compensation is an "essentially [an] ad hoc, factual inquir[y]") Moreover, Utah courts also
have acknowledged that evaluating the reasonableness of an exaction is a fact-intensive
inquiry

1111 In Home Builders Ass n v City of
American Fork, 1999 UT 7, 973 P 2d 425, the
Utah Supreme Court stated that "[exactions,]
such [as] fees[,] are constitutionally permissible if the benefits derived from their exaction
are 'of "demonstrable benefit" to the subdivision,' and if newly developed properties are

Id at 115 (quoting Banberry, 631 P2d at
903-04) This list, while not exhaustive, illustrates that the determination of whether an
exaction is reasonable is a fact-intensive inquiry

8

9

The dissent argues that even if we were to
apply section 17-27-708 to the instant appeal it
would not change the result
We do not advo
cate the substitution of section 17-27-708 for
section 17-27-1001 Instead we simply refer to
case law interpreting section 17-27-708 to sup
port our conclusion that the district court s role
in this case is limited to determining whether the
Board acted arbitrarily capriciously or illegally
in summarily denying BAM s taking claim

The dissent spends considerable time discuss
mg the differences between board of adjustments
and county commissions We acknowledge the
distinction between these two bodies but note
that review from both is limited to whether the
decision was arbitrary capricious or illegal
This similarity is the basis for our analogy to
section 17-27-708
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[Development exactions may be defined as
contributions to a governmental entity imposed as a condition precedent to approving the developer's project. Usually, exactions are imposed prior to the issuance of a
building permit or zoning/subdivision approval. Development exactions may take
the form of: (1) mandatory dedications of
land for roads, schools or parks, as a condition to plat approval, (2) fees-in-lieu of
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage
connection fees, and (4) impact fees.
Salt Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808
P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (quotations and
citations omitted); see also No. 13 Richard
R. Powell, Powell on Real Property,
§ 79D.04[2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., 2003) (noting that "exactions" are generally sought through several methods: (1)
land dedication requirements, (2) land dedication requirement with fee option, (3) im1114 However, because we anticipate that a pact fees, or (4) in-kind exactions). In Dolan
county body will have to determine the con- v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct.
stitutionality of the exaction, we provide 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) and Nollan v.
some guidance regarding the proper stan- California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
dard to apply. BAM argues that its proper- 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), the
ty has been taken without just compensation. United States Supreme Court developed a
The Takings Clause, which applies to the two-part test for determining whether a parstates through the Fourteenth Amend- ticular developmental exaction violated the
ment, declares: "[N]or shall private prop- takings clause of the United States Constituerty be taken for public use, without just tion.
compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V.
H 15 In Dolan, the Court concluded that
One of the Clause's primary purposes is for a development exaction to be constitution"'to bar Government from forcing some al, the government must show an " 'essential
people alone to bear public burdens which, nexus'... between the legitimate state interin all fairness and justice, should be borne est' " and the land dedication requirement.
by the public as a whole.' "
512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 2317 (citation
Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, omitted). The Court further explained that
257 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting Dolan v. to succeed the government "must make some
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. sort of individualized determination that the
2309, 2316, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994)). One required dedication is related both in nature
type of "taking" associated with subdivision and extent to the impact of the proposed
approval is a "development exaction."
development." Id. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-

[5] 1112 Here, the absence of a record at
the administrative level prevented the district court from evaluating the propriety of
the Board's action as directed by Utah Code
Annotated section 17-27-1001(3)(a). We
conclude that the district court erred when it
received evidence on BAM's taking claim.
The district court should have, instead, determined that the Board, in the absence of an
adequate factual record, acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in deciding BAM's takings claim.
1113 Thus, we reverse the district court's
decision and remand the case directing the
district court to enter a judgment that the
Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it failed to conduct a hearing on BAM's
takings claim. The district court should then
remand the case to the proper county agency, directing that agency to conduct a proper
hearing on BAM's takings claim.10

10. Effective in 2000, Salt Lake County substantially changed its governmental structure Prior
to the change, the County was governed by three
County Commissioners We remand this case
directing the district court to order a hearing on
BAM's takings claim However, in light of the
change in county structure, remand to the Board
of Commissioners is impossible Thus, the district court must also determine which Salt Lake
County governmental body should consider
BAM's takings claim

The dissent attacks this approach as "repugnant to the important principles of judicial economy " While we admit that in this case it might
be quicker to ignore the appropriate standard of
review and address the merits of this case, we
would do so in direct opposition to the mandate
of Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001
The more appropriate approach is to balance the
desire for judicial economy against the need for
judicial restraint In this case, as in most cases,
judicial restraint should, and does, prevail

716 Utah

87 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES

20. The Court labeled this examination a
"rough proportionality" test. Id. at 391, 114
S.Ct. at 2319.
1116 Here, BAM was required to dedicate
thirteen additional feet of land that abutted
3500 South before the County would approve
its subdivision plat. We conclude that this
constitutes a developmental exaction as described in Nollan and Dolan. Accordingly,
the Nollan/Dolan "rough proportionality"
test applies in this case. Therefore, upon
remand, the reviewing body must determine:
(1) whether requiring the exaction serves a
legitimate government interest, and (2)
whether there is a " 'rough proportionality'"
between the exaction and the "impact of the
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20; see also No. 13
Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property,
§ 79D.04[2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., 2003).11

ORME, Judge (dissenting):
1119 With neither party having so argued,
it is perplexing that the majority insists on
analyzing the propriety of the trial court's
actions under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708
(2001), while at the same time admitting that
this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-27-1001 (2001). I disagree with this
approach and the remedy of starting over
before an entity of county government yet to
be selected by the trial court. This result is
especially disturbing given the County's concession in its brief that "BAM followed the
appeal procedure outlined in the Utah statute and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordinance provisions]."

1120 Under both sections 17-27-708 and
17-27-1001, judicial review "is limited to a
determination of whether the [challenged]
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708(2)(a). See
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (3)(a)(ii).
1117 We conclude that the district court However, section 17-27-708 restricts the triexceeded its authority when it conducted a
al court's authority to take evidence, while
hearing and received evidence on BAM's taksection 17-27-1001 does not. By its own
ings claim contrary to the limits established
terms, section 17-27-708 applies only to trial
in Utah Code Annotated section 17-27court review of "any decision of a board of
1001(3)(a). The distnct court should have
adjustment." Id. § 17-27-708(1). BAM's
concluded that the Board acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in deciding BAM's taking appeal was not, of course, from a decision of
issue without conducting a hearing. Accord- a board of adjustment, but from a decision of
ingly, we reverse the district court's decision, the Salt Lake County Board of Commissionand remand directing the district court to set ers. This distinction is significant, given the
aside the Board's determination. The dis- very limited purview of a board of adjusttrict court shall then identify the proper body ment's powers and duties, which, at the time
to conduct a full hearing on the merits and of BAM's appeal to the County Commission,
was to "hear and decide . appeals from
remand the case to that body.
zoning decisions applying the zoning ordi1118 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, nance^] special exceptions to the terms of
the zoning ordinance^ and] variances from
Judge.
11. In Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 U S 374, 114
S.Ct. 2309, 129 LEd2d 304 (1994), the United
States Supreme Court announced for the first
time a "rough proportionality" test to apply
when evaluating the constitutionality of exactions. Id at 391, 114 S Ct. at 2319 In Dolan,
the Court acknowledged that the majority of
states have adopted a "reasonable relationship"
test Id The Court concluded that the "reasonable relationship" test was "close[ ] to the federal
constitutional norm " Id However, the Court
declined to adopt the phrase "reasonable relationship" because of its similarity to the phrase
"rational basis " Id In all other respects, it

appears that the Court adopted a "reasonable
relationship" test and simply renamed it the
"rough proportionality" test.
Utah has also applied the "reasonable relationship" test when evaluating the constitutionality
of an exaction See, e g , Home Builders Ass'n v.
City of Am Fork, 1999 UT 7,1114-16, 973 P 2d
425 (applying the "reasonable relationship" test
to a real estate development fee), Banberry Dev
Corp v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899, 905
(Utah 1981) (applying the " 'reasonable relationship' " test to a subdivision impact fee (citation
omitted))
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the terms of the zoning ordinance." Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a)-(c) (1995) (emphasis added).1 The Salt Lake County zoning ordinances, contained in Title 19 of the
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, are
not relevant to this appeal. Rather, this
appeal contests the County's power to require highway dedication from abutting property owners under Title 15 of the Salt Lake
County Code of Ordinances. Understanding
the difference in function between a board of
adjustment and a county commission goes a
long way in demonstrating that there is a
rational basis for the distinction between section 17-27-708, applicable only to judicial
review of board of adjustment decisions, and
section 17-27-1001, applicable to land use
decisions generally. Such an understanding
dispels any notion that the Legislature meant
to include section 17-27-708's restriction in
section 17-27-1001, but just forgot to say so,
or that, on some other basis, the restriction
should be grafted onto section 17-27-1001.
1121 Boards of adjustment are adjudicative
bodies—they take sworn testimony and compel the attendance of witnesses, see id. § 1727-702(3); they keep records of their proceedings, see id. § 17-27-702(4)(b)(ii); and
they may even choose to make their record
with the same completeness as a district
court, i.e., by means of a court reporter or
tape recorder. See id. § 17-27-702(4)(c). In
sharp contrast, county commissions are not,
first and foremost, adjudicative bodies and
thus are not positioned to generate the kind
of record that a board of adjustment will.
Thus, a restriction on judicial roving into the
evidentiary realm in the case of a board of
adjustment decision makes sense: There
should already be an adequate record. However, in contrast, it makes no sense to pre-

elude a court from taking evidence where a
county commission has made the decision
under attack because no equivalent record
will ordinarily have been made by the county
commission.2 Therefore, the general provision set forth in section 17-27-1001 controls,
not the provision limited, by its own terms, to
boards of adjustment.

1. The powers and duties of the board of adjustment have since been expanded See Utah Code
Ann. § 17-27-703(2001)

Adjustment") (emphasis in original), and at the
municipal level See Bradley v Payson City
Corp , 2003 UT 16,11 13, 70 P.3d 47 ("[A] board of
adjustment is a quasi-judicial body designed only
to correct specific zoning errors "), Harmon
City, Inc v Draper City, 2000 UT App 31,1(16,
997 P 2d 321 (noting that "[t]he distinction between quasi-judicial decisions of a board of adjustment as opposed to legislative municipal zoning decisions is significant boards of adjustment
have no legislative powers and are not permitted
to have those powers")

2. Prior cases have distinguished boards of adjustment from local legislative bodies, both at the
county level, see Toone v Weber County, 2002 UT
103,117, 57 P3d 1079 (recognizing that section
17-27-707, for example, "grant[s] boards of adjustment limited power to grant zoning variances"); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P 2d 331,
333 (Utah 1980) (stating that "the County Commission is charged with the responsibility for
approving subdivision plats—not the Board of

U 22 The majority argues that the language
in section 17-27-708 "strengthens Lits] position that the district court erred in receiving
evidence" because section 17-27-1001 is silent on the matter. Specifically, section 1727-708(5)(a)(ii)-(b) states: "The [trial] court
may not accept or consider any evidence
outside the board of adjustment's record unless that evidence was offered to the board of
adjustment and the court determines that it
was improperly excluded by the board of
adjustment [or] there is no record." Id.
(emphasis added). The logic of the majority's argument is flawed. Section 17-27-708
restricts the trial court's authority to take
evidence unless one of the two enumerated
exceptions applies. Section 17-27-1001,
however, contains no such restriction. Without the restriction, there is no hindrance to
the trial court's receiving evidence. See Biddie v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT
110,1114, 993 P.2d 875 ("[0]missions in statutory language should 'be taken note of and
given effect.'") (quoting Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d
217, 219 (1973)). Indeed, if silence meant the
trial court cannot consider evidence in the
absence of express authorization, there would
simply be no reason for the restriction expressed in section 17-27-708—it would already be the case that evidence could not
ordinarily be received by the reviewing court.
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1123 Significantly, this court has previously
relied on a statute applicable to a board of
adjustment decision in an appeal stemming
from a planning commission decision, only to
have our error corrected by the Utah Supreme Court. In Sandy City v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct.App.1990)
(Sandy City I), rev'd, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah
1992) (Sandy City II), this court applied
former section 10-9-15,3 the municipal analogue to current section 17-27-708, to an
appeal stemming from an action of the Salt
Lake County Planning Commission. See
Sandy City I, 794 P.2 at 486. In so doing,
this court stated that its review was limited
to the administrative record. See id. The
Utah Supreme Court called attention to our
error in Sandy City II, indicating that "the
court of appeals [mistakenly] confined its
review to the administrative record," because, "[f]irst, section 10-9-15 applies only to
municipalities, not to counties[, and sjecond,
section 10-9-15 applies only to relief sought
from the actions of the board of adjustment,
not from the actions of the planning commission or the board of county commissioners."
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4. Interestingly, the Court
also noted that, "[a]t the time [Sandy City I
was decided], no analogous statute regulated
legal grievances arising from the actions of
Salt Lake County or the planning commission; consequently, there was no basis for
the court of appeals to confine its review to
the administrative record." Sandy City II,
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4.

1001. If it is improper to apply a statute
applicable to actions of a board of adjustment
even when there is no comparable statute
governing appeals from another governmental body, it seems axiomatic that it would be
improper to do so when there is such a
statute.

3. That section provided, in relevant part, that
"any person aggneved by any decision of the
board of adjustment may have and maintain a
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction " Utah Code Ann § 109-15(1986)

receive additional evidence in that case unless it
determined that such evidence "was improperly
excluded by the board " Utah Code Ann § 1727-708(5)(a)(n)
BAM's appeal, on the other
hand, was summarily denied by the Salt Lake
County Board of Commissioners, whose response consisted entirely of the following statement: "The Board of County Commissioners, at
its meeting held this day, upheld the planning
commission approval and denied the request of
B.A.M. Development, Inc , for an appeal on PL97-1063, Westndge Meadows 7755 West 3500
South " Patterson, then, is quite unlike the case
before us

1125 But even if it were somehow proper
to analyze the trial court's actions under
section 17-27-708, it would not change the
approach in the instant appeal. As the majority recognizes, a trial court may not "accept or consider any evidence outside the
board of adjustment's record" under section
17-27-708 unless: (1) there is no record, see
id. § 17-27-708(5)(b), or (2) "evidence was
offered to the board of adjustment and the
court determines that it was improperly excluded." Id § 17-27-708(5)(a)(ii). Because
there was no record made in connection with
BAM's appeal to the Salt Lake County
Board of Commissioners, the instant case fits
squarely within the exception enumerated in
section 17-27-708(b).4 Therefore, even if we
do look to section 17-27-708 in analyzing the
trial court's actions, as the majority urges,
the court properly called witnesses and took
evidence, which evidence is properly now
part of our record. See Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984)
(" The nature and extent of [judicial] review
depends on what happened below as reflected by a true record of the proceedings'
[before the board of adjustment. Thus], if
1124 Contrary to the law in existence at the the hearing had proceeded in accordance
time Sandy City I was decided, we do now with due process requirements, the reviewhave a statute that controls appeals from ing court could look only to the record, but
land use decisions of the Salt Lake County where it had not or where there was nothing
Board of Commissioners—section 17-27- to review, the reviewing court must be al-

4.

It is curious, then, that the majority cites Patterson v Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893
P.2d 602 (Utah Ct App 1995), in support of its
proposition that the trial court erroneously received evidence m the instant case As the majority recognizes, the board of adjustment in
Patterson conducted a hearing and received evidence. See id. at 603 Therefore, pursuant to
section 17-27-708, a reviewing court could not
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lowed to get at the facts.") (emphasis added)
(decided under former section 10-9-15). Accord Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756
P.2d 704, 709-10 (Utah CtApp.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
1126 Accordingly, the appeal is ripe for
decision by this court and, in my view, it
should be resolved at this juncture. 5 If I
were writing the opinion for the court, I
would write as follows:

1127 Plaintiff B.A.M. Development, L.L.C.
(BAM) appeals the trial court's decision holding that Defendant Salt Lake County (the
County), acting pursuant to its Transportation Master Plan, could constitutionally require BAM to dedicate a fifty-three-foot
right-of-way, without compensation, as a condition to approval of BAM's subdivision proposal. The trial court's decision should be
reversed and remanded.
BACKGROUND 6
U28 Salt Lake County Ordinance
15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-801 (2001), requires dedication and improvement of public street
right-of-way space by developers of abutting
property in accordance with the County's
Transportation Master Plan. The Transportation Master Plan is based on traffic projections and recommendations from the Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Utah
Department of Transportation (UDOT), including a long-range transportation study
projecting highway capacity needs in Salt
Lake County to the year 2020.
U29 In July of 1997, BAM submitted a
proposal to develop Westridge Meadows subdivision on a fifteen-acre parcel at approximately 7700 West 3500 South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's fee simple
interest in the parcel proposed for subdivi5. This sound approach, fully consistent with the
plain language of the statutory sections analyzed,
also advances the cause of avoiding inefficiency,
duplication, and delay. Considerable court resources have already been expended on this case,
resulting in a two-day bench trial which produced a voluminous record. It has been briefed
and argued to this court and, as will be obvious,
has been the object of much deliberation and

sion development extended to the center line
of 3500 South Street at its northern boundary. Pursuant to Salt Lake County Ordinance 15.28.010, BAM's proposed plat indicated a forty-foot half-road-width dedication
at 3500 South Street, running along the
northern boundary of BAM's adjacent property. The dedication was to be used for the
eventual widening of 3500 South, a state
highway abutting the proposed subdivision.
3500 South is a thoroughfare used by the
traveling public, which will also be used by
future subdivision residents, although the
highway is not directly accessible from the
subdivision.
1130 On September 9, 1997, the County
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject
to compliance with County ordinances and
departmental requirements in these terms:
1. Construction of curb, gutter, sidewalk
and street improvements on proposed
and adjoining streets including 3500
South (sidewalk on 3500 South to be 6'
wide and placed next to the fence).
2. Elimination, relocation, piping, or fencing open ditches and/or canals within or
adjacent to the subdivision by subdivider
as agreeable to irrigation users or company.
3. Construction of a 6' high non-climbable
barrier fence along 3500 South as these
lots are non-vehicular access to 3500
South. A gate is to be constructed on
each lot for property owner access and
this note to be on Mylar.
4. Dedication of 40' from the center line
of 3500 South to Salt Lake County for
street right-of-way.
5. Modification of design as worked out
by County Departments and subdivider.
6. Final plat to be drawn on a subdivision
mylar by a licensed surveyor.
7. Street on west to be dedicated and
constructed with curb and gutter on
analysis. Remanding this case to the trial court,
with instructions to send it back to the County to
repeat the fact-finding process, is repugnant to
the important principle of judicial economy.
i. This opinion borrows liberally from the trial
court's Findings of Fact.
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west side and curb, gutter & sidewalk on
east side.
8. Comply with all conditions of the .2
overpressure zone. This note to be on
mylar.
9. A minimum 15' wide landscaping area
to be installed along 3500 South. The
landscape strip to be maintained by the
adjacent property owner. Plan to be
approved by Development Services
Staff.
10. Install traffic calming devices as approved by Transportation Engineer.
1131 On September 15, 1997, UDOT received BAM's subdivision proposal. UDOT
responded that the current required highway
dedication for 3500 South at the location of
BAM's proposed subdivision was a fiftythree-foot half-road-width right-of-way, not
forty feet, as indicated by the County's
Transportation Master Plan. In June of 1998,
the County incorporated the revised right-ofway requirement of fifty-three feet into its
Transportation Master Plan. That same
month, the County granted preliminary approval of BAM's subdivision proposal subject
to compliance with, among other things, the
fifty-three-foot right-of-way dedication.7
1! 32 On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a notice of
appeal with the Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the County's requirement of a fiftythree-foot dedication and the resulting "increased expenses" and requesting approval
of the subdivision proposal with a forty-foot
dedication. The Board of County Commissioners summarily denied BAM's appeal, and
BAM filed suit against the County in district
court, alleging, among other things, that the
County's development exactions were "unreasonable and excessive" and effected a taking
of BAM's property without just compensation. After a two-day bench trial, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of the Coun7. The June 1998 approval was contingent upon
additional requirements which, aside from the
fifty-three-foot dedication, substantially mirror
the September 1997 requirements listed above
However, the June 1998 approval eliminated the
former requirement regarding ''[a] minium 15'
wide landscaping area
along 3500 South"
and added a requirement that the landowner

ty on all counts, concluding that, inter aha,
"BAM failed to establish a cause of action on
its 'takings' claim." The trial court subsequently denied BAM's "Motion for Entry of
New Findings and/or Additional Findings"
and its "Motion for a New Trial," and BAM
appealed to this court.
1133 While the above litigation was in process, the County approved BAM's amended
subdivision plat, which had been modified,
under protest, to include the required fiftythree-foot highway dedication. In August of
1999, BAM's subdivision plat was recorded in
the Salt lake County Recorder's Office, and
BAM later began construction of Westridge
Meadows.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1134 BAM raises several issues on appeal,
but its first argument is dispositive. BAM
argues that requiring it to dedicate property
for eventual use in widening a street, and
improve adjacent property, all without compensation, as a condition to approval of its
subdivision proposal, constitutes an unconstitutional "taking" of its property in violation
of both federal and state law. This question
of law is reviewed under the "correction-oferror standard[ ]," with no particular deference accorded to the trial court. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
ANALYSIS
I. Introduction: Takings Jurisprudence
1135 BAM argues that requiring it to dedicate a fifty-three foot strip of property and
undertake various improvements to property
outside the subdivision as a condition to approval of its subdivision proposal effects a
"taking" in violation of state and federal constitutional law. Before proceeding to the
merits of this claim, it is necessary to discern
the nature of BAM's takings challenge.8 In
"[ljnstall an emergency service turnaround as
required by the Fire Department "
8. At oral argument, BAM correctly characterized
its claim as one for inverse condemnation, which
"is simply a generic description applicable to all
actions in which a property owner, in the absence of a formal condemnation [i.e, eminent
domain] proceeding, seeks to recover from a
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so doing, this opinion first summarizes relevant United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.9
1136 The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 586, 41 L.Ed.
979 (1897), provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation." 10 U.S. Const, amend. V.
The Court has traditionally recognized two
categories of takings: "physical takings" and
so-called "regulatory takings." See, e.g., Yee
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527, 112
S.Ct. 1522, 1528, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) (distinguishing the Court's "regulatory takings
cases" from its "physical takings" cases);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3173,
73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (distinguishing a
"physical occupation" from a "regulation that
merely restricts the use of property"); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124-25, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (implicitly recognizing
distinct categories of physical and regulatory
takings); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Gwings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 559
(2001) ("[I]t is indisputable that the case law
recognizes the existence of two types of takgovernmental entity for the appropriation of his
property interest " 2A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6 14[1], at 6-227 (3d ed 2002) "[T]he
inverse condemnation action is available to any
landowner who suffers destruction or impairment of a protected private property right " Id
§ 6 14[1], at 6-230 Moreover, although BAM
correctly points out that inverse condemnation
claims brought under Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution are "self-executing," this
means only that such claims may be brought
even absent authorizing legislation and that such
claims are exempt from the limitations found in
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act See Colman v Utah State Land Bd, 795 P 2d 622, 63035 (Utah 1990) It does not follow, as BAM
contends, that inverse condemnation claims are
automatically exempt from requirements such as
exhaustion of administrative remedies
9. The lack of a "coherent test" and resulting "sea
of uncertainty" in takings law inspired one pair
of commentators to quip that "takings jurisprudence is considered a leading candidate for the
'doctnne-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-prmciple
prize ' " Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L J 547, 558-60 (2001)
(citation omitted) Another scholar noted that

ings: physical takings and regulatory takings."). Each of these more familiar types of
takings, and a third category known as "development exactions," are addressed below.
A. Physical Takings
1137 A physical taking requires government activity in the form of an invasion,
occupation, or intrusion. See, e.g., Loretto,
458 U.S. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171. "[Governmental action [that] results in '[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property,
by the government itself or by others," Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 831, 107 S.Ct 3141, 3146 (1987) (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted), constitutes a per se taking and "requires compensation under the [Takings] Clause." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617,
121 S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592
(2001). See also Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112
S.Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)
("[A]t least with regard to permanent invasions[ ], no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public
purpose behind it, we have required compensation."). Cf Yee, 503 U.S. at 539, 112
S.Ct. at 1534 ("Because the
ordinance
does not compel a landowner to suffer the
"[t]he incoherence of the U S Supreme Court's
output in this field has by now been demonstrated time and again by practitioners and academic
commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add
to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for
the paper consumed in this frustrating and increasingly pointless enterprise " Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark Has the
U S Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort
to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?,
30 The Urban Lawyer 307, 308 (Spring 1998)
Nevertheless, a summary of takings jurisprudence is important in the disposition of BAM's
appeal, especially considering the dearth of Utah
case law on the subject
10. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provides that
"[p]nvate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation "
Utah Const art I, § 22 The Utah provision
has been characterized as broader than its federal counterpart because it protects not only property that is "taken," but also property that is
"damaged" for public use See Bagford v Ephraim City, 904 P 2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995)
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physical occupation of his property, it does
not effect a per se taking under Loretto")
(emphasis in original).
B. Regulatory Takings

1139 Despite the ad hoc nature of regulatory takings inquiries, at least one general rule
has emerged: "[T]he Fifth Amendment is
violated when land-use regulation 'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.'" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016,
112 S.Ct. at 2894 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Agvns v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260,
100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106
(1980)).11 Cf. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake
City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Utah Ct.App.1988)
("Where governmental action, not amounting
to a physical taking, effectively deprives a
property owner of reasonable access to property, the owner is entitled to compensation[.]") (footnote omitted). This general
rule incorporates the underlying principle
that while "[o]ur cases have not elaborated
on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest[,]'
[t]hey have made clear
that a broad
range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements." Nollan,
483 U.S. at 834-35, 107 S.Ct. at 3147. See
also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at
3179 ("We do not
question the
substantial authority upholding a State's broad
power to impose appropriate restrictions
upon an owner's use of his property.") (emphasis m original).

1138 In contrast to a physical taking, a
regulatory takings claim challenges state or
local laws that impose "regulations" or "restrictions" on the "use " of property. Yee,
503 U.S. at 532, 539, 112 S.Ct. at 1531, 1534
(emphasis in original). See Loretto, 458 U.S.
at 430, 102 S.Ct. at 3173 ("[RJecent cases
confirm the distinction between a permanent
physical occupation
and a regulation that
merely restricts the use of property."). In
the famous words of Justice Holmes, "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158,
160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). However, "[i]n 70odd years of succeeding regulatory takings
jurisprudence, [the Court has] generally eschewed any set formula for determining how
far is too far." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 112
S.Ct. at 2893 (quotations and citations omitted). Instead, the Court has "examined the
taking question by engaging in essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors—such as the economic impact of
the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
C. Development Exactions
character of the governmental action—that
have particular significance." MacDonald,
1140 Along with the traditional categories
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. of physical and regulatory takings, a third
340, 349,106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 category of takings has emerged in the case
(1986) (quotations and citations omitted).
law, namely "development exactions."12
11. The per se rule of Lucas is not absolute, but is
limited by "the restnctions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership " Lucas v
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U S 1003,
1028, 112 SCt 2886, 2900, 120 L Ed 2d 798
(1992)
12. It is helpful to think of exactions as sort of a
hybrid between physical and regulatory takings
The Court acknowledged as much in Nollan v
California Coastal Commission when it characterized "a classic right-of-way easement" as a
physical taking but nevertheless applied the regulatory takings test 483 U S 825, 831 & n 1,
107 SCt 3141, 3146 & n 1, 97 L Ed 2d 677
(1987) ("We think a 'permanent physical occupation' has occurred
where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to

and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises ") The Court explained "Given, then, that requiring uncompensated conveyance of the easement outright would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the question
becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a
condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the
outcome" Id at 834, 107 SCt at 3147 The
Court then applied the regulatory takings test of
whether the regulation " 'substantially advancefs] legitimate state interests' and does not
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
l a n d ' " Id (alterations in original) (citations
omitted)
Similarly, in Dolan v City of Tigard, the Court
distinguished the garden-vanety regulatory tak-
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" '[Development exactions may be defined as
contributions to a governmental entity imposed as a condition precedent to approving
the developer's project. Usually, exactions
are imposed prior to the issuance of a building permit or zoning/subdivision approval/ "
Salt Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808
P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). Exactions will generally "serve more
than a single development," 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 17.01, at 17-7 (2002), and
" 'may take the form of: (1) mandatory dedications of land for roads, schools or parks, as
a condition to plat approval, (2) fees-in-keu of
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage
connection fees and (4) impact fees/" Salt
Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808 P.2d at
1058 (citation omitted). Exactions "enable
local government to acquire land for highway
expansion at no charge to the public. The
dedicated land is reserved m its present state
until the government is ready to widen the
adjacent highway or construct a new roadway."
8A Nichols, Eminent Domain
§ 17.02[3], at 17-17.
1f 41 In the famous Nollan and Dolan decisions, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677
(1987), the Court adopted a two-pronged test
mgs cases from the case before it, which involved
a redevelopment permit conditioned upon a
forced dedication of land See 512 U S 374,
385, 114 SCt 2309, 2316, 129 L Ed 2d 304
(1994) The Court stated
First, [those cases] involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of
the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual
parcel Second, the conditions imposed were
not simply a limitation on the use petitioner
might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to
the city
Id (emphasis added) Thus, it is clear that exactions do not fit neatly into either the regulatory
or physical takings jurisprudence See Rogers
Mach , Inc v Washington County, 181 Or App
369, 45 P 3d 966, 973 (characterizing exactions
as an "amalgamation" between physical and regulatory takings and noting that "[ejxactions do
not fit neatly within the more conventional Takings Clause analytical construct"), review denied,
334 Or 492, 52 P 3d 1057 (Or 2002), cert denied,
538 U S 906, 123 SCt 1482, 155 L Ed 2d 225
(2003), Town of Flower Mound v Stafford Es-

that development exactions- •at least when
they take the form of forced dedications of
property—must satisfy to withstand scrutiny
under the Takings Clause.13 In Nollan, the
Court revisited the "long[-]recognized" rule
that a "land-use regulation does not effect a
taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not *den[y] an
owner economically viable use of his land.'"
Id. at 834, 107 S.Ct. at 3147 (second and
third alterations in original) (citation omitted). The Court acknowledged that it had
"not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a legitimate state
interest' or what type of connection between
the regulation and the state interest satisfies
the requirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter." Id. In addressing
these questions, the Court set forth the first
prong of the Nollan/Dolan test: there must
be an "'essential nexus'
between the
'legitimate state interest' and the permit condition exacted by the [governmental entity]."
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 2317
(quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837,107 S.Ct. at
3148).
U42 In Dolan, the Court resolved the
question it left unanswered in Nollan. If an
"essential nexus" exists, what is the required
degree of connection between the exactions
tates, 71 S W 3 d 18, 30 (Tex App) ("In an exaction takings case, the landowner is not simply
denied or restricted in some desired use of his
property Rather, in an exaction takings case,
some action—the exaction—is required of the
landowner as a condition to obtaining governmental approval "), review granted, 2002 Tex
LEXIS 209 (Tex 2002), Sparks v Douglas County, 127 Wash 2d 901, 904 P 2d 738, 742 (1995)
(recognizing that "[the physical takings] rule
does not necessarily apply
where c onveyance
of a property right is required as a condition for
issuance of a land permit"), 8 Nichols, Eminent
Domain § 14E 04[4], at 14E-33 & 14E-34 (2002)
("[T]he Dolan rule applies only to case-by-case
land exactions, and not to community wide zoning and land use regulations "), Taking "Takings
Rights" Seriously A Debate on Property Rights
Legislation Before the 104th Congress, 9 Am U
Admin L J 253, 277 (1995) (designating Dolan
as an example of a "special category of cases
called dedication and exaction cases")
13. As explained more fully below, it is unclear
whether the Court's analysis applies to development exactions other than forced dedications of
property
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and the projected impact of the proposed
development? 14 In response, the Court set
forth the "rough proportionality" prong of
the test, which requires the governmental
entity to "make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20.

P.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). More importantly, the facts of this case mirror the facts
of both Nollan, where the landowner was
forced to grant an easement to the public in
exchange for a building permit, and Dolan,
where the landowner was forced to dedicate
a portion of her property to the city of
Tigard in exchange for a development permit. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86, 114
1143 To summarize the Nollan/Dolan two- S.Ct. at 2317.
H45 Having concluded that BAM has statprong test, a development exaction in the
form of a forced dedication of real property ed a claim for an exaction in the form of a
will constitute a taking, necessitating just forced dedication of real property, it is necescompensation, unless the government demon- sary to determine what, if any, procedural
strates that (1) an "'essential nexus' exists requirements BAM must comply with and
between the 'legitimate state interest' and whether it has done so in this case.
the permit condition exacted by the [governII. Preservation of Issues
mental entity]," and (2) "the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to
11 46 The County argues, and the trial court
the impact of the proposed development." agreed, that "the only issue appealed by
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391, 114 S.Ct. at BAM to the County Commission, and thus
2317, 2319-20.
preserved by exhaustion of administrative
H 44 After considering the rules and ratio- remedies, was the County's requirement of a
nales underlying physical, regulatory, and ex- 53-foot highway dedication, rather than a 40actions takings cases, it appears that BAM's foot dedication." Thus, the County mainclaim most closely fits within the framework tains that "the only issue properly before this
of the development exactions cases. The Court" is whether the thirteen-foot increase
County conditioned approval of BAM's pro- in the County's dedication requirement efposed subdivision on dedication of property fected a taking of BAM's property. BAM,
to be used in the future for widening 3500 on the other hand, urges us to address the
South—at least if the County's Master constitutionality of the entire fifty-three-foot
Transportation Plan were to be eventually dedication as well as the County's additional
implemented. The forced dedication is a in-kind improvement requirements.
" 'contribution ] to a governmental entity
H47 Although the County phrases its arguimposed as a condition precedent to approv- ment in jurisdictional terms, the County's
ing the developer's project,'" which is within objection, in reality, is one of issue-preservathe definition of an exaction as set forth in tion rather than exhaustion of administrative
Salt Lake County v. Board of Education, 808 remedies.15 Tellingly, the County concedes
14. The Court did not address this question in
Nollan because, while it "agreed that the Coastal
Commission's concern with protecting visual access to the ocean constituted a legitimate public
interest," the Court determined there was no
"essential nexus" between "visual access to the
ocean and a permit condition requiring lateral
public access along the Nollans' beachfront lot"
Dolan, 512 U S at 386-87, 114 S Ct at 2317
Because the "essential nexus" prong was not
satisfied, the Court had no occasion to decide
"the required degree of connection between the
exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development" Id. at 386, 114 S Ct at
2317
15. In any event, it is far from clear that exhaustion requirements would apply to BAM, at least

insofar as its challenge to the County's forced
dedication of real property is concerned It is
true that in reference to a garden-variety landuse regulation, "an essential prerequisite to its
assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development
legally permitted on the subject property A
court cannot determine whether a regulation has
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes " MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v
Yolo County, Ml U S 340, 348, 106 S Ct 2561,
2566, 91 L.Ed 2d 285 (1986). Such logic does
not apply to a development exaction consisting of
a forced dedication of real property. The County
did not attempt to regulate the "use" of BAM's
land, but conditioned its approval of BAM's subdivision proposal on a forced dedication of real
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that "BAM followed the appeal procedure
outlined in the Utah statute and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordinance provision[s]." Thus, the County's real quarrel is
with the wording of BAM's appeal to the
Board of County Commissioners, which challenges the County's decision to deny development approval with the 40-foot dedication
and argues that the County's imposition of
"increased expenses and uncompensated dedication of private property for public use, is
arbitrary, capricious, .. and contrary to
law."
1148 It is true that "a party seeking review
of agency action must raise an issue before
that agency to preserve the issue for further
review." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Pursuant to the
"level of consciousness" test, "a plaintiff
[must] bring an issue to the fact finder's
attention so that there is at least the possibility that it could be considered." 16 Id.
149 It must be concluded that BAM's appeal properly encompassed its objection to
the entire dedication of real property such
that the Board of County Commissioners
was, or should have been, conscious of it.
BAM's argument that the County should
have approved its proposal with the 40-foot
dedication does not foreclose its further argument that the County's requirement of
"uncompensated dedication of private property," in whatever amount, is "unconstitutional."

State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 n. 7
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (applying level of consciousness test to hearing before State Tax
Commission);
Ashcroft v. Industrial
Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah Ct.
App.) (holding that plaintiff waived issues not
presented to the administrative law judge
during formal hearing), cert, denied, 868 P.2d
95 (Utah 1993). In light of the fact that the
County Commission summarily denied
BAM's appeal without a hearing, foreclosing
the opportunity for BAM to develop and
explain its concerns, an unnecessarily
crabbed reading of BAM's notice of appeal is
not required by the "level of consciousness"
test, and that test does not foreclose consideration of the constitutionality of requiring
the entirefifty-three-footdedication.
1151 A different conclusion is reached, however, on the question of whether BAM properly preserved its objection to the County's
requirement that certain in-kind improvements be made. On appeal, BAM challenges, to an unclear extent, a number of
improvements required by the County as a
condition to subdivision approval, including
installation of curbs, gutters, stormdrain
lines, sidewalks, and fencing. BAM argues
that such improvements are "unconstitutionally excessive and/or unreasonable." The
only possible evidence of preservation of this
argument in BAM's written appeal to the
Board of County Commissioners is in BAM's
objection to the County's "increased expenses." Even under the most liberal con11 50 Furthermore, this case is in a some- struction of BAM's notice of appeal, it cannot
what unusual posture because the "level of be said that this issue was sufficiently raised
consciousness" test is being applied not to a such that the Board of County Commissionhearing or other administrative proceeding, ers should have been conscious of it.
but to BAM's written notice of appeal. Cf.
11 52 Furthermore, even if BAM had propBadger, 966 P.2d at 847 (applying level of erly preserved this argument, BAM advances
consciousness test to informal hearing before no convincing argument that the County's
State Engineer); US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah improvement requirements should be invaliproperty The only question is whether the
County's exaction of BAM's property constituted
a taking See Nelson v City of Lake Oswego, 126
Or App 416, 869 P 2d 350, 353 (1994) (en banc)
("[No] case of which we are aware attaches an
exhaustion or ripeness prerequisite to the litigation of claims, like those here, that are based on
a development condition that has resulted in the
actual acquisition of a private property interest
by the government")

16. The "level of consciousness" test is a "less
exacting standard" than that applied in a trial
setting, where preservation requires that "(1) 'the
issue
be raised in a timely fashion,' (2) 'the
issue
be specifically raised,' and (3)[the] party must introduce 'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.' " Badger v Brooklyn Canal
Co , 966 P 2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (quoting Hart
v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130
(Utah Ct.App ), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah
1997))
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dated, or for that matter even analyzed, under Nollan and Dolan.11 The County cannot
force BAM to dedicate and improve 3500
South based solely on its own transportation
planning goals, rather than on the impacts of
BAM's subdivision, because this would force
BAM "alone to bear public burdens which, m
all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4
L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Nevertheless, there is
"an important distinction between ordinances
requiring installation of streets, sidewalks,
sewers and drainage facilities which are inextricably tied to the needs of the subdivision
development, and those ordinances which require dedication of land
where the nexus
between the use requirement and the subdivision development is less than evident." 2A
Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6
218 (3d ed.2002). See also AH Piculell
Group v. Clackamas County, 142 Or.App.
327, 922 P.2d 1227,1234 (1996) ("[Conditions
that in whole or in part serve the needs of
the development itself should be weighed
differently than pure factions* of the kind
that serve only to mitigate an impact of the
development on the public or public facilities.").

the needs of [BAM's] subdivision," 2A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6-218,
because such improvements undoubtedly inure to the convenience and safety of the
subdivision residents. In any event, absent
proper preservation at the County Commission level and a well-developed argument on
appeal, BAM's objection to the County's inkind improvement requirements need be addressed no further.

1153 For example, the County's requirement that BAM install a fence and a sidewalk
along the portion of its property abutting
3500 South seems to be "inextricably tied to

1155 As outlined above, it must now be
determined whether the two-pronged Nollan/Dolan test is satisfied here. The County, however, argues that the Nollan/Dolan

17. This is not to say that improvement exactions
may never be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny
See McClure v City of Springfield, 175 OrApp
425, 28 P3d 1222, 1227-28 (2001) (applying
Dolan to city ordinance requiring dedication of
property and installation of sidewalks, driveway
improvements, and street lighting), review denied,
334 Or 327, 52 P 3d 435 (2002), Art Piculell
Group v Clackamas County, 142 OrApp 327,
922 P2d 1227, 1230-31 (1996) (applying Dolan
to county requirement that landowner dedicate
and approve public street abutting his subdivision), Clark v City of Albany, 137 OrApp 293,
904 P2d 185, 189 (1995) (applying Dolan to
improvement exactions because the court saw
"little difference between a requirement that a
developer convey title to the part of the property
that is to serve a public purpose, and a requirement that the developer himself make improvements on the affected and nearby property and
make it available for the same purpose"), review
denied, 322 Or 644, 912 P 2d 375 (1996), Town
of Flower Mound v Stafford Estates, 71 S W 3d
18, 33 (TexCtApp) (applying Dolan to town
ordinance requiring road improvements because

improvement exactions "involve conditional governmental land use approval and present the
same opportunities for governmental 'leveraging'
[as dedicatory exactions]"), review granted, 2002
Tex LEXIS 209 (Tex 2002), Benchmark Land v
City of Battle Ground, 94 Wash App 537, 972
P2d 944, 950 (1999) (holding that "Nollan and
Dolan apply here where the City requires the
developer as a condition of approval to incur
substantial costs improving an adjoining street"),
affd on other grounds, 146 Wash 2d 685, 49 P 3d
860 (2002), Burton v Clark County, 91 Wash
App 505, 958 P 2d 343, 348, 357 (1998) (applying Nollan/Dolan to county requirement that permit applicants make "road dedications and improvements"), review denied, 137 Wash 2d 1015,
978 P 2d 1097 (1999) But see Parking Ass'n of
Georgia, Inc v City of Atlanta, 264 Ga 764, 450
S E 2d 200, 201-02, 204 (1994) (refusing to apply Dolan to city parking lot ordinance requinng
owners to install barner curbs and landscaping
improvements even though three dissenting justices argued that Nollan and Dolan were controlling), cert denied, 515 U S 1116, 115 S Ct 2268,
132 L Ed 2d 273 (1995)

III. Merits of BAM's Takings Challenge
1154 Having resolved the threshold issue of
preservation, this opinion proceeds to the
merits of BAM's takings challenge. Although BAM has formulated its takings challenge to include separate claims for relief
under both state and federal law, the legal
principles underlying both claims are largely
the same and this opinion therefore treats
them concurrently. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 27
Cal.4th 643, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87,
100-101 (2002) (construing federal and state
takings clauses congruently); Sparks v.
Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d
738, 741 (1995) (same).
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exactions analysis does not apply to this case.
Specifically, the County argues, and the trial
court agreed, that the Nollan/Dolan analysis
applies only to "ad hoc discretionary assessment[s] imposed on an individualized basis"
and not to "a generally-applicable legislative
scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory
standard for road-width dedication by subdivision developments." 18

1156 In the instant case, it should not
matter whether the County ordinance at issue here is indeed a "generally applicable"
"uniformly imposed" legislative scheme because Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny19
should apply to any forced dedication of real
property, regardless of whether the exactions
are imposed on an individualized basis or via
a comprehensive legislative scheme.20 This

18. It should be noted that unrebutted evidence
introduced at trial casts substantial doubt on this
charactenzation in any event For example, testimony from William A Marsh, a land-use planner employed by Salt Lake County for over twenty-eight years, elicited the following information
Q Okay How does the county determine
how much that developer then dedicates,
m other words, what the half width actually is?
A When the subdivision application is processed, the recommendation is sent out
In the case of 3500 South, where it's a
state highway, it goes to the county transportation engineer and to UDOT
Q Okay And who makes that determination
as to what the half width is?
A It would be based on the recommendations that come back from those agencies
Q Okay So at any given moment we can't,
say, look in the book and see what that
half width determination is?
A We have the map that guides us, but until
we get the final written recommendation
we don't know for sure
Such testimony belies the County's assurances
that there is no discretion involved in assessing
its road-width dedication requirements

at issue, Nollan, 483 U S at 841, 107 S Ct at
3150-51, implies that such claims are subject to
increased scrutiny beyond that applied to garden-variety land-use regulations As discussed in
Note 20, courts and commentators have disagreed about what type of cases invoke Nollan/Dolan scrutiny Most, however, agree that Nollan
and Dolan do impose some sort of heightened
scrutiny See, e g, San Remo Hotel v City &
County of San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 117
Cal Rptr 2d 269, 41 P 3d 87, 102 (2002) (" 'Thus
in Nollan, the rule that [physical occupations are
per se takings] is transformed, in the context of a
development application, into a rule of heightened scrutiny to ensure that a required development dedication is not a mere pretext to obtain
or otherwise physically invade property without
just compensation ' ") (citation omitted) See
also Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains & Real
Steals Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 Iowa
L Rev 1, 4, 9-12 (2000) (arguing that "wholesale
application of Dolan to regulatory takings jurisprudence would abruptly dismantle nearly seventy-five years of zoning law")

19. There has been some confusion about whether
Nollan and Dolan imposed a new form of heightened scrutiny In Nollan, the Court stated that
"our verbal formulations in the takings field have
generally been quite different" from "those applied to due process or equal protection claims"
because "[w]e have required that the regulation
'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State
"could rationally have decided " that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective
483 U S at 834 n 3, 107 S Ct at 3147 n 3
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted) Therefore, Nollan and Dolan could be interpreted as
merely clarifying the heightened scrutiny that
already applied to regulatory takings claims
See, e g, Smith Inv Co v Sandy City, 958 P 2d
245, 258 n 18 (Utah CtApp 1998) ("[Tjhe takings analysis
adds the word 'substantially'
before 'advance ' Thus, this standard appears to
be more stringent than the standard against
which we measured the substantive due process
validity of the ordinance")
However, the
Court's subsequent warning about being "particularly careful about the adjective" of "substantial" when an "actual conveyance of property" is

20. It must be acknowledged that the scope of the
Nollan/Dolan analysis is unsettled In other
words, because both Nollan and Dolan were
decided in the context of forced dedications of
real property administered, according to the
Court, on an individualized, adjudicative basis, it
is unclear whether one or both of those conditions must exist for Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny to apply See, e g , Fennell, Hard Bargains, 86 Iowa L Rev at 10-11 (stating that two
uncertainties exist after Nollan and Dolan (1)
"whether Dolan's requirement of rough proportionality applies when land use 'conditions' are
not selectively imposed on individual landowners, but are instead embedded in legislative enactments" and (2) whether Nollan and Dolan,
which "both involved actual concessions of land"
apply to "other kinds of concessions (such as
cash payments or the provision of unrelated
amenities)") See also Rogers Math Inc v
Washington County, 181 OrApp 369, 45 P 3d
966, 976 (2002) ("In the eight years since Dolan
was decided, no consensus has emerged among
lower courts on [the above] questions and, so far,
the Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari m cases that might have provided further
guidance "), review denied, 334 Or 492, 52 P 3d
1057 (2002), cert denied, 538 U S 90b, 123 S Ct
1482, 155 L Ed 2d 225 (2003) See also, eg, San
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is so for at least two reasons. First, "[i]t is
not clear why the existence of a taking
should turn on the type of governmental
entity responsible for the taking." Parking
Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515
U.S. 1116, 115 S.Ct. 2268, 2268-69, 132
L.Ed.2d 273 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For example, "[a] city council can
take property just as well as a planing commission can."21 Id. at 1118, 115 S.Ct. at
2269. See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of
Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926, 214 Ill.Dec.
526, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself
from a takings challenge merely by utilizing
a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert, denied,
519 U.S. 976, 117 S.Ct. 413, 136 L.Ed.2d 325
(1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175
Or.App. 425, 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to
make particularized findings showing that
any resulting exactions were roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development"), review denied, 334 Or. 327, 52 P.3d
435 (2002).
Remo Hotel, 117 Cal Rptr 2d 269, 41 P 3d at
102-05 (discussing scope of Nollani'Dolan analysis), Krupp v Breckenrtdge Sanitation Dist, 19
P3d 687, 695-98 (Colo 2001) (en banc) (same),
Town of Flower Mound, 71 S W 3d at 31-35
(same), Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between
Legislative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v
City ofTigard, 75 NYU L Rev 242, 252 (2000)
(cataloguing the pervasive confusion among lower courts attempting to interpret and apply Dolan)
21. Noting the conflict among lower courts over
"whether Dolan's test for property regulation
should be applied in cases where the alleged
taking occurs through an Act of the legislature,"
Justice Thomas concluded
It is hardly surprising that some courts have
applied Dolan's rough proportionality test even
when considering a legislative enactment
[T]he general applicability of the ordinance
should not be relevant m a takings analysis If
Atlanta had seized several hundred homes in
order to build a freeway, there would be no
doubt that Atlanta had taken property The
distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings
appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference

1157 Second, it is not always easy to tell
the difference between an individualized, adjudicative decision and a "uniformly imposed" legislative scheme. This ambiguity is
manifest in Dolan itself, where the majority
characterized the city's action as an "adjudicative decision" without further explanation,
while Justice Souter, in dissent, pointed out
that "the permit conditions were imposed
pursuant to [the city's] Community Development Code."22 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 413, n. *, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2331, n. *
(1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). Distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative action is made even more difficult because "local governments are not structured under
stnct separation of powers principles" and
"the nature of the land use decision-making
process relies on flexibility and discretion."
Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 242, 257
(2000).23 Notwithstanding these uncertainties, it must be concluded that all forced
dedications of property are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. This conclusion is
premised on the United States Supreme
Court's well-settled takings jurisprudence
Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc , v City of Atlanta,
515 U S 1116, 115 SCt 2268, 2268-69, 132
L Ed 2d 273 (1995) (Thomas, J , joined by O'Connor, J , dissenting from denial of certiorari)
22. Specifically, the City of Tigard imposed the
floodplam exaction pursuant to its Master Drainage Plan, codified in its Community Development
Code and required by the State of Oregon, which
required land dedications from all permit applicants seeking to develop land "within and adjacent to the 100 year floodplam" Dolan, 512
U S at 377-79, 114 S Ct at 2313-14 Of course,
these facts are strikingly similar to the ones before us, where the County, acting pursuant to its
Transportation Master Plan, required dedications
from all landowners seeking to develop property
abutting 3500 South Street It seems, therefore,
that the County cannot fairly characterize the
scheme in Dolan as "ad hoc" and "discretionary" without so characterizing its own
23. Ms Reznik astutely points out that some exactions "are somewhere in the middle of adjudicative and legislative" because "the legislature
[may give] some guidelines, [while] the administrative body retam[s] considerable discretion as
well " Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v City of
Tigard, 75 N Y U L Rev at 266
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holding that physical invasions, occupations,
or mandated conveyances of real property
are entitled to special treatment. As the
Court stated in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,
our cases describe the condition for
abridgement of property rights through
the police power as a 'substantial advancing]' of a legitimate state interest.
We are inclined to be particularly careful
about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to
the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in
that context there is heightened risk that
the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated
police-power objective.
483 U.S. 825, 841,107 S.Ct. 3141, 3150-51, 97
L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) (alteration and first emphasis in original). The Court has "repeatedly held that, as to property reserved
by its owner for private use, 'the right to
exclude [others is] "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."'" Id. at
831, 107 S.Ct. at 3145 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted). Anything less than Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, at least when an actual
conveyance of property is at issue, falls short
of adequately protecting these rights. Accordingly, this opinion now addresses the
question of whether the County's uncompensated dedication requirement passes muster
under Nollan.
A. Nollan and the "Essential Nexus"
U58 Under Nollan, "[a court] must first
determine whether the 'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state interest'
and the permit condition exacted by the [governmental entity]." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386,
114 S.Ct. at 2317 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 836-37, 107 S.Ct. at 3148). In doing so
here, it is appropriate to review the facts of
Nollan.
1159 The Nollans planned to replace their
beachfront bungalow with a three-bedroom
house. When they applied to the California
Coastal Commission for a development permit, the Nollans were told the permit would
be denied unless they agreed to a public
easement across their beachfront lot. The

Commission argued that the easement was
necessary to advance legitimate state interests such as "protecting the public's ability to
see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using
the beach created by a developed shorefront,
and preventing congestion on the public
beaches." Id. at 835, 107 S.Ct. at 3148. The
Court assumed, without deciding, that the
above interests were legitimate and agreed
with the Commission that "a permit condition
that serves the same legitimate police-power
purpose as a refusal to issue the permit
should not be found to be a taking if the
refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking." Id. at 836, 107 S.Ct. at 3148.
Thus, if the "Commission could have exercised its police power . . . to forbid construction of the house altogether," it may, in the
alternative, impose permit conditions—for
example, height or width restrictions—that
would further the legitimate state interest of
protecting "the public's ability to see the
beach." Id,
1160 However, the Court went on to explain that "[t]he evident constitutional propriety disappears ... if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further
the end advanced as the justification for the
prohibition." Id at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3148.
Such was the case in Nollan. The Court
found it
quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new
house[,] how it lowers any "psychological
barrier" to using the public beaches, or
how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of
the Nollans' new house.
Id. at 838-39, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Thus, "the
lack of nexus between the condition and the
original purpose of the building restriction
converts that purpose to something other
than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation."
Id, at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Such a restriction "is not a valid regulation of land use but
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'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" Id. (citation omitted).
1161 Having reviewed the holding and rationale underlying Nollan, this opinion now
turns to the facts of the instant case. The
County devotes the majority of its takings
analysis to argumg that Nollan and Dolan
are inapphcable to this case. In so doing,
the County fails to articulate, in the alternative, the legitimate state interests in support
of its dedication requirements, arguing only
in passing that "[s]uch a uniform scheme is
fundamental to ensuring that community development occurs in accordance with sensible
long-range transportation planning."24 Following the lead of the Nollan Court, it may
be assumed that the County's traffic goals
are a legitimate governmental interest.25
See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d
245, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (" '[I]t is clear
that the flow of traffic is a legitimate concern
of a municipal legislative body in its enactment of zoning regulations.'") (quoting Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of
Zoning § 3A.04 (4th ed.1996)). Nevertheless, the validity of the interest does not, by

itself, justify imposing the entire cost of realizing that goal upon BAM and other landowners whose property abuts 3500 South.
See 8A Nichols, Emment Domain § 17.01, at
17-6, 17-7 (2002) (articulating the reasons "it
makes a great deal of sense for a governmental agency to attempt to acquire, or at least
reserve, land for major roads before an area
develops" but nevertheless noting that "the
need for reducing the cost of acquiring public
right-of-way
cannot override the constitutional guarantee that an individual's property rights be protected"). Rather, the
County must demonstrate an "essential nexus" between that interest and the roadway
dedication requirements it imposed upon
BAM. Although the County fails to undertake this demonstration in its bnef, the record reveals unrebutted evidence, introduced
at trial, that construction of the Westridge
Meadows subdivision, consisting of forty-four
single-family units, would increase traffic
flow along 3500 South only "by approximately three to four percent."26
U 62 Clearly, there is an "essential nexus"
between the problem of increased traffic

24. The Commission advanced a similar argument in Nollan, pointing out that it had already
similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of
land, and that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14
had been approved when the Commission did
not have administrative regulations in place
allowing imposition of the condition, and the
remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property
483 U S at 829, 107 S Ct at 3144 The Commission argued that such a scheme was necessary as "part of a comprehensive program to
provide continuous public access along [the
beach] as the lots undergo development or redevelopment" Id at 841, 107 SCt at 3151 The
Court was unmoved, holding that such a justification was "unrelated to land-use regulation"
and was "simply an expression of the Commission's belief that the public interest will be served
by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach
along the coast " Id The Court continued
The Commission may well be right that it is a
good idea, but that does not establish that the
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can
be compelled to contribute to its realization
Rather, California is free to advance its "comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using its
power of eminent domain for this "public purpose
Id at 841-42, 107 S Ct at 3151

quirements for new construction along major
traffic corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, and
other impact characteristics of each individual
parcel " This would only be true if BAM was
challenging the County's authority to require
road-width dedications as a condition of development BAM's argument, however, is that while
the County surely has the authonty to require
such dedications, it does not have the authority
to require them for free Contrary to the County's contention, BAM's view would have no effect
on the uniformity of road width along 3500
South—it would just mean that the cost of such
uniformity would be borne by the public, not by
BAM alone

25. To this end, the County argues that "under
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-width re-

26. This conclusion is based on a study promulgated by the Institute of Transportation Engineers, which estimates that the typical residential
dwelling generates an average of ten car trips
per day Thus, Westridge Meadows, consisting
of forty-four units, would generate approximately
440 additional trips per day on 3500 South, the
nearest major street to which Westridge Meadows residents would have vehicular access Evidence at trial showed that, in 1997, about 13,000
cars traveled on 3500 South per day Therefore,
the 440 additional trips generated by the Westridge Meadows subdivision would increase the
1997 estimate by, at most, three or four percent
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along 3500 South, insofar as attributable to
the subdivision, and the solution of property
dedication so that 3500 South can eventually
be widened. The County, understandably,
must project and prepare for the inevitable
increase in traffic along state highways.
Should widening of 3500 South become necessary in the future, the County ideally
would be able to accomplish this without
having to buy, only to then demolish and
remove, existing structures. BAM's subdivision, as acknowledged by both sides at trial,
will necessarily contribute, albeit a relatively
small amount, to increased traffic along 3500
South and the eventual need for a wider
road. Thus, the County's roadway dedication requirements are connected to the goal
of insuring that the County will be able to
fulfill that need. Having determined that an
essential nexus exists between a legitimate
state interest and the required condition of
approval, this opinion now addresses whether
the required dedication is sufficiently related
in both nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.

114 S.Ct. at 2313. The city responded that,
in exchange for the permit, the landowner
would be required to dedicate "the portion of
her property lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage
system
and that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the
floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway."
Id. at 379-80,114 S.Ct. at 2314. As justification for these exactions, the city argued, first,
that the floodplain dedication was necessary
to alleviate the "anticipated increased storm
water flow from the subject property to an
already strained creek and drainage basin."
Id. at 382, 114 S.Ct. at 2315. Second, the
city argued that "creation of a convement,
safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an
alternative means of transportation 'could
offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby]
streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion'" caused, at least in part, by the
proposed development. Id. at 381-82, 114
S.Ct. at 2314.

B. Dolan and Rough Proportionality
1163 Dolan requires this court to determine whether the exactions demanded by the
County bear a "rough proportionality" to the
"projected impact of [BAM's] proposed development." 512 U.S. at 388-91, 114 S.Ct. at
231&-19. In Dolan, the landowner applied
for a building permit to expand her plumbing
and electrical supply store. See id. at 379,

11 64 After determining that the above justifications satisfied the "essential nexus"
prong of Nollan, the Court was left with the
question of "whether these findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on petitioner's
building permit." Id. at 389, 114 S.Ct. at
2318. After reviewing "representative decisions" by State courts addressing this question, the Court adopted the "rough proportionality" test.27 Id. at 389-91, 114 S.Ct. at

27. As support for the adoption of this test, the
United States Supreme Court cited Call v City of
West Jordan, 606 P 2d 217 (Utah 1979) (Call I),
modified on reh'g, 614 P 2d 1257 (Utah 1980)
(Call II), the only Utah case of which I am
aware that addressed the constitutionality of exactions in the form of forced dedications of property In Call I, our Supreme Court addressed
the validity of a city ordinance that required
subdividers to dedicate seven percent of their
land, or pay the cash equivalent, as a condition
to development approval The Court originally
upheld the ordinance against a takings challenge
because the dedication, which was to be used for
" 'flood control and/or parks and recreation facilities,' " bore a "reasonable relationship to the
needs created by the subdivision " Id at 220
This was so, the Court held, even though the
dedication requirements would necessarily benefit the whole community along with the individual subdivision See id

After granting the landowner's petition for rehearing, however, the Utah Supreme Court held
that "disposition of this issue as a matter of law
[is] inappropriate," Call II, 614 P 2d at 1258,
"without plaintiffs being given the opportunity to
present evidence to show that the dedication
required of them had no reasonable relationship
to the needs for flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by their subdivision, if
any" Id at 1259 Like the United States Supreme Court, I think the "reasonable relationship" test is virtually equivalent to the "rough
proportionality" test, and thus presents no issue
of inconsistency between the precedents of the
United States and Utah Supreme Courts See
Dolan, 512 U S at 391, 114 S Ct at 2J19 ("[T]he
'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to the federal
constitutional norm[,]
[b]ut we do not adopt
it as such partly because the term
seems
confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis'
which describes the minimal level of scrutiny
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2318-19. In other words, "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development.', Id. at 391,
114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. Under this test, the
Court determined that the city had failed to
demonstrate that its permit conditions bore a
"rough proportionality" to the "projected impact of [the landowner's] proposed development." Id. at 388-95, 114 S.Ct. at 2318-22.
1165 Regarding the floodplain dedication,
the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious
surface will increase the quantity and rate of
storm water flow from petitioner's property."
Id. at 392, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. "Therefore,
keeping the floodplain open and free from
development would likely confine the pressures
created by petitioner's development." Id. at 393, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. The
city, however, "demanded more—it not only
wanted petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property
for its greenway system." Id. The city
failed to explain "why a public greenway, as
opposed to a private one, was required in the
interest of flood control." Id.
1166 Further, "[w]ith respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway," the Court accepted
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment") Indeed, the Court itself
used the two terms interchangeably See id at
391,395, 114 SCt at 2319, 2321
We are, however, presented with a potential
conflict between state and federal law insofar as
Call II, decided before Nollan and Dolan, appears to place the burden on the party challenging the dedication to show that it "had no reasonable relationship to the needs
created by
their subdivision," Call II, 614 P 2d at 1259,
while Dolan places this burden on the entity of
local government See Dolan, 512 U S at 391 n
8, 114 SCt at 2320 n 8 (While "in evaluating
most generally applicable zoning regulations, the
burden properly rests on the party challenging
the regulation," the burden is on the government
to "justify the required dedication" when it
makes "an adjudicative decision to condition
[an] application for a building permit on an
individual parcel ") It must be noted, however,
that the landowner in Call II, at the request of
the city, paid a fee instead of actually conveying
his property to the city, Call I, 606 P 2d at 218,
so the cases are distinguishable on that basis
Additionally, in Call v City of West Jordan, 727
P2d 180 (1986) {Call III), the Court upheld a

the city's finding that "the larger retail sales
facility proposed by petitioner [would] increase traffic" in the downtown area by an
estimated "435 additional trips per day." Id.
at 395, 114 S.Ct. at 2321. The Court also
acknowledged that "[dedications for streets,
sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive
congestion from a proposed property use."
Id.
1167 Nevertheless, the Court held that the
city's conclusory statement that "the creation
of the pathway 'could offset some of the
traffic demand'" fell far short of "demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle
and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's
development reasonably relate to the city's
requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement." Id at 395,
114 S.Ct. at 2321-22 (emphasis added). The
Court concluded that while
[t]he city's goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and providing
for public greenways, are laudable
there are outer limits to how this may be
done. "A strong public desire to improve
the public condition [will not] warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the
change."
trial court order which placed "the burden of
producing evidence" regarding "the reasonableness of the impact fee" on the city Id at 182
In so doing, the Court indicated that Call II
should be interpreted in light of the Court's subsequent decision in Banberry Development Corp
v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899 (Utah 1981),
which states
Since the information that must be used to
assure that subdivision fees are within the
standard of reasonableness is most accessible
to the municipality, that body should disclose
the basis of its calculations to whoever challenges the reasonableness of its subdivision or
hookup fees Once that is done, the burden of
showing failure to comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness in this matter is on the challengers
Id at 904 See also Call III, 727 P 2d at 181
However, where the burden of proof ultimately
falls should not affect the outcome here because,
even if the burden properly rests on BAM, it has
presented sufficient evidence that the County's
dedication requirement does not have the requisite relationship—whether couched in terms of
reasonableness or rough proportionality—to the
impact of BAM's subdivision
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Id. at 396, 114 S.Ct. at 2322 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
416, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922))
(second alteration in original).
1168 The justifications advanced in favor of
the County's highway dedication requirements in this case suffer from the same
shortcomings as those identified in Dolan.
As acknowledged earlier in this opinion, the
County's goal of "ensuring that community
development occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning" qualifies as a legitimate public purpose. However, the County has not demonstrated why, in
the interest of transportation planning, BAM
must convey the right-of-way to the County
outright, instead of, for example, implementing a set-back requirement that would prohibit BAM and similarly situated property
owners from erecting structures that could
complicate the future widening of 3500
South.

nent Domain § 1.42[2], at 1-239 (3d ed.
2002) ("[WJhere the need for a road is substantially generated by public traffic demands, rather than by the proposed development, eminent domain must be used rather
than the police power.").28 Cf. Sparks v.
Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d
738, 741, 746 (1995) (upholding county dedication requirements where proposed development "would approximately double traffic"
along adjacent streets).

28. Although Dolan does not require "precise
mathematical calculation," it does not preclude a
mathematical inquiry, and the Court in fact considered such evidence m Dolan 512 U S at
391, 395, 114 S Ct at 2319, 2321 In any event,
mathematical calculations, while not required,
are at least one way to show an exaction is not
roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development See Art Piculell Group v
Clackamas County, 142 OrApp 327, 922 P 2d
1227, 1235 (1996) ("[Dolan ] m fact requires

some quantification [and thus] such information,
although not necessarily determinative, may be
considered ") (emphasis in original)

11 70 Under Dolan, the County "must make
some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. There appears to
be no such evidence in the record before us.
While it is agreed that community development and transportation planning are worthy
goals, the County should not be permitted to
implement these goals in an unconstitutional
H 69 Similarly, the anticipated three to four fashion by avoiding the compensation repercent increase in traffic congestion caused quirement.29 "Rather, [the County] is free to
by the subdivision does not, by itself, justify advance its comprehensive program, if it
the County's dedication requirement, which wishes, by using its power of eminent domain
in essence requires BAM to pay for 100 for this public purpose, but if it wants [a
percent of the cost of the County's long- right-of-way] across [BAM's] property, it
range transportation goal of widening 3500 must pay for it." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842-43,
South, at least as to the portion of 3500 107 S.Ct. at 3151 (citations and quotations
South that abuts BAM's property. Any ar- omitted).
gument the County makes to the contrary is
fatally hobbled by its repeated assertions
CONCLUSION
that "the County highway-dedication requirement operates mdependently of any unique
H 71 The County's exaction requiring dedicharacteristics or proposed uses of specific cation of afifty-three-footnght-of-way along
parcels to which it applies." While it is clear 3500 South Street constitutes a taking of
that the County employed such reasoning to BAM's property under both the Fifth
convince the court that Nollan and Dolan do Amendment of the United States Constitunot apply to this case, it still leaves the tion and Article I, Section 22, of the Utah
County a "far cry" from the "individualized Constitution. BAM is entitled to just comdetermination" required by Dolan. Id. at pensation for its property, and this court
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319. See 1 Nichols, Emi- should reverse and remand for determination

29. It is acknowledged that the County may validly administer these goals via its dedication ordinance Nevertheless, the County should not be
permitted to short circuit the just compensation
requirement by reading its ordinance to require
landowners to dedicate their property for free
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of an appropriate award.30 Such award
should reflect unrebutted evidence that the
County's dedication requirement caused
BAM to lose two lots that it could have
otherwise developed. See, e.g., City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56,1119, 28 P.3d 697
(" '[Landowners must be put in as good a
position money wise as they would have occupied had their property not been taken.'")
(quoting State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 43, 305
P.2d 495, 497 (1957)).

Barry KELLY, individually and in the
right of Wapiti Heights, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company, Plaintiff and
Appellant,

motion for summary judgment, and denied
member's motion to amend his complaint.
Member appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Norman
H. Jackson, J., held that:
(1) member did not have standing to bring
quiet title action against lender on 12
of company's properties that were
transferred at foreclosure sale;
(2) misnomer of grantee in warranty deed
transferring seven of company's properties did not invalidate the transfer;
and
(3) trial court abused its discretion in denying member's motion to amend his
complaint to add interference with contractual relations and breach of fiduciary duty claims against lender.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded
in part.

v.

Russell W. Bench, J., concurred in the result.
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HARD MONEY FUNDING, INC., a Utah
corporation; each assignee of a beneficial interest of a certain trust deed;
Gary A. Weston, as trustee under a certain trust deed; M.V.I.; JJ Associates;
and V.C.I., Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20020854-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 4, 2004.
Background: Member of limited liability
company brought quiet title and declaratory judgment action, on behalf of company
and in his individual capacity, against lender who held security interest in properties
once owned by the company. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department,
William B. Bohling, J., granted lender's
30. To the extent BAM has successfully persuaded
me of the fundamental soundness of its position,
that success should not be attributed, in any
degree, to its counsel's unrestrained and unnecessary use of the bold, underline, and "all caps"
functions of word processing or his repeated use
of exclamation marks to emphasize points in his
briefs Nor are the briefs he filed in this case
unique Rather, BAM's counsel has regularly
employed these devices in prior appeals to this

1. Appeal and Error <S>761
Declaratory Judgment <s>392.1
Argument by member of limited liability
company in appeal of quiet title and declaratory judgment action against lender who had
security interest in properties once owned by
company, that purported involvement by
lender in scheme of other members of company to defraud company should act as
grounds to subordinate lender's interest in
the properties to member's own claims
against other members, would not be addressed on appeal, though member alluded to
argument in his various discussions of the
alleged mvolvement of lender in the various
machinations of other members, where member had not specifically argued subordination
issue in his appellate brief, and did not procourt While I appreciate a zealous advocate as
much as anyone, such techniques, which really
amount to a written form of shouting, are simply
inappropriate m an appellate brief It is counterproductive for counsel to litter his brief with
burdensome material such as "WRONG1
WRONG ANALYSIS'
WRONG RESULT'
WRONG' WRONG' WRONG'" It is also at
odds with Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

APPENDIX "2"
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances
§§ 15.28.010; 18.080.010; 18.24.010

Title 15 BUILDINGS AND CONSTRUCTION
Chapter 15.28 HIGHWAY DEDICATION

15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.020, no building or structure shall be erected,
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on
any lot or parcel of land which abuts a major or secondary highway, as shown on the map
entitled, "The County Transportation Improvement Plan," on file with the planning and
development services division and made part of this chapter by reference, or other public street
which does not conform to current county width standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel
within the right-of-way of the highway to be widened or additional required street width has been
dedicated to the county and improved. The dedication and improvements shall meet the
standards for such highway or street as provided in Section 15.28.060. (Ord. 1473 (part), 2001:
Ord. 961 § 1 (part), 1986: prior code § 2-6-1)

Title 18 SUBDIVISIONS
Chapter 18.08 GENERAL REGULATIONS

18.08.010 Procedure generally.
Before subdividing any tract or lot or parcel of land into two or more lots, a subdivider shall:
A. Prior to or coincident with the submission of the preliminary plat, file with the planning
commission a completed subdivision information form or forms to be furnished by the planning
commission;
B. File with the planning commission for examination and subsequent approval or disapproval,
nineteen black and white prints of the preliminary plat prepared in conformance with the
provisions of this title. Prints shall be filed at least fifteen days prior to the planning commission
meeting at which the plat is to be considered, and shall be accompanied by a filing fee as
provided for in Section 3.52.020;
C. Within two years after receiving approval of the preliminary plat by the planning commission,
submit the original and one copy of the final plat to the planning commission for final approval or
disapproval, as the case may be. The planning commission may grant a one-year extension of
such time period if the request for extension is received prior to the expiration date. In approving
any extension, the planning commission may review and modify or amend the original approval
conditions and requirements;
D. Present, after receiving final approval by the planning commission, the original of the final plat
to the county council;
E. Obtain final approval by the county council, which shall deposit the final plat bearing all official
approvals as required in this title in the office of the county recorder for recording at the expense
of the subdivider, who shall be notified of such deposit by the county recorder. Approval of the
final plat by the planning commission shall be void if the plat is not recorded within one year after
the date of approval, unless application for an extension of time is made in writing to the planning
commission and granted during the one-year period;
F. The water supply and sewage disposal shall have been approved by the health department.
(Ord. 1473 (part), 2001: Ord. 1222 § 3,1993: Ord. 1073 § 2, 1989; Ord. 879 (part), 1983; Ord.
795, 1982; prior code § 19-2-1)

Title 18 SUBDIVISIONS
Chapter 18.24 REQUIRED IMPROVEMENTS

18.24.010 Certification of improvements.
No final plat of a subdivision of land shall be recorded, except as provided in Section 18.08.030,
without receiving a statement signed by the planning and development services division certifying
that the improvements described in the subdivided plans and specifications have been
completed, that they meet the minimum requirements of all ordinances of the county, that they
comply with the standards and requirements of the health department, the planning and
development services division, the planning commission and the county fire department. (Ord.
1473 (part), 2001: Ord. 879 (part), 1983: prior code § 19-5-1 (part))

